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I
INTRODUCTION

In a West German state, the practical problems of governing and policing
are similar to those found in the United States. Assuming legislative enactments of limited scope, how are these translated into operational policies as a
general matter and applied in enforcement decisions at the individual level?'
This article seeks to capture the institutional and operational essence of police
discretion in West Germany by reference to three specific inquiries that look
beyond the substantive law that empowers some action: (1) who makes a
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1. This Symposium relates most directly to an inquiry begun by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis
in DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969), that sought to find a role for discretion in

tailoring general categories of the law to individual justice. Professor Davis distinguished between
reasonable and "extravagant" versions of the principle of the rule of law as a primary stumbling
block in examinations of discretion. In a nutshell, the extravagant version maintains that all lawful
government action is conducted in accordance with preexisting rules or guidelines. The reasonable
version acknowledges that government agents outside the legislative branch not only enforce the
law, but also make it. Is Professor Davis's argument with principles or with institutions? His analysis
may be misplaced when applied to West German institutions, since a West German federal state is
based on (and its police are subject to laws which take into account) what Professor Davis would term
the extravagant version of the rule of law. Under the strict interpretation rejected by Professor
Davis, theoretical discretion is largely a problem of enforcement and interpretation of existing laws.
Indeed, Germans view legal discretion in these terms. See infra notes 4-22 and accompanying text.
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decision whether to take any action; (2) how is a choice made among the competing possibilities; and (3) whether an action once taken may be challenged
and, if so, by whom.
Beyond scholarly interest, this examination of police discretion in Europe
is important for what it reveals indirectly about the American scene. German
law and political organization are different enough from that of the United
States, 2 however, to require an introduction before reaching the functional
analysis of direct interest. This article commences with a survey of the general treatment of discretion in German public law. It then examines in greater
detail the institutional and substantive law framework within which the
modern police operate. Finally, the article explores empirical work concerning the West German police and their exercise of discretion. Before we
evaluate any exercise of West German police discretion, we must understand
3
West German police on their own terms.
In comparison to Americans, the Germans try much harder to channel
police actions through training and through accountability for actions after
the fact. For jurisprudential and historical reasons, both popular and scholarly opinion are uncomfortable with the implications of unbridled governmental discretion. Nonetheless, current empirical work examining German
2. Examination of police discretion assumes an understanding of the organizational and substantive law framework within which the police operate. In Germany, one confronts an evolving
institution in a modern continental European civil law administrative state that is supported by different political theories and with a historical background very different from English (and later,
American) constitutional development. The police and their role in West German society have been
in the public eye and changing since the late 1960's. The impetus for change has come from the
social unrest resulting from successive broad political debates: student unrest in the late 1960's;
Notstandsgesetzgebung (emergency powers for the government, enacted into the late 1960's); terrorist
activities of the Baader-Meinhoff group, the Rote Armee Fraktion and various splinter groups in the
early 1970's (currently enjoying a resurgence in attacks on NATO installations); a legal and political
debate in the mid-1970's relating to the changes in the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure-the socalled lex Baader-Meinhoff-and police law (cast in the form of a government-sponsored new model
police law and a counter-proposal from more liberal academics, the Musterentwurf eines einheitlichen
Polizeigesetzes and the Alternativentwurf einheitlicher Polizeigesetze des Bundes und der Lander, respectively)
involving both elements of neutral reform and expansion of police authority (in response to arguments that police did not have the tools to deal with civil disorder); civil disobedience in the late
1970's related to radical political action and ecological concerns; recent social unrest related to the
unavailability of housing in urban areas and police response to mass squatter actions; recent suggested reforms alleged to restrict political free speech by criminalizing certain misbehavior in demonstrations; and, currently, the fear that the otherwise legitimate peace movement may develop
violent splinter groups opposing the stationing of new Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western
Europe. Analogous to the American political scene in the late 1960's, the police have been criticized
as "soft" by the political right and "repressive" by the political left. Incidental to episodic social
unrest, the German police have enjoyed a long term upgrading of budgetary allocations for both
personnel and equipment for domestic security (Innere Sicherheit), which has in turn altered the age
structure and expectations of the police. Police management expects these changes to have long
term effects.
3. This article aims to present a picture of the West German police in context and cannot lay
claim to a comprehensive presentation of police law or criminal procedure constraints within which
the West German police work. To pursue the substantive law in detail, the reader is directed to the
selected German sources given in the footnotes. No systematic effort was made to include Englishlanguage treatments of subjects discussed herein, since many of the available materials are dated and
concerns alluded to in this article can be pursued beyond the superficial level only in German materials. For the interested reader, however, the plea bargaining-prosecutorial discretion materials cited
in note 62 are the best English-language materials and contain citations to older English materials.
All translations herein are the author's.
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police discretion reaches the not very surprising conclusion that German
police do make decisions and control outcomes beyond the bounds of their
theoretically strictly limited freedom of action. From the standpoint of an
American lawyer, however, this functional exercise of discretion pales in comparision to the apparent decision-channelling effect of prior training, professional incentives, managerial supervision on the job, and administrative and
judicial review after the fact.
The guiding premise of this article is that discretion stands in a peculiar
relationship to accountability in legal systems strictly adhering to the principle
of the rule of law. In the administrative practice of a West German federal
state, where bureaucratic acts are subject to internal and judicial review to a
much greater extent than in the United States, shifting responsibility for decisions within the administrative hierarchy may constitute the functional
equivalent of discretion. Viewed as a jurisdictional contest among various
governmental organs, shifting responsibility for the entry level decision channels the subsequent review functions. This shifting comes to rest at the operational level of the police, where enforcement is subject to individual
decisions.
What is the immediate relevance of the German experience for the American scene? On a primary level, the value of training (both in and outside the
classroom) as affecting the exercise of discretion should be recognized. However, guidance through training requires the prior articulation of standards
before they can be taught to officers. Apart from constitutional criminal procedure and despite the recognition that the policeman's job involves more
than apprehending criminals, most American police are probably not provided with well-articulated standards to guide their more common decisions.
In the absence of guidance, it is not surprising that similar cases produce different results. While differentiated solutions to challenges have validity in
individual instances, increased diversity too often raises the spectre of legal
uncertainty and arbitrariness, implicit criticisms of excessive police freedom
of action.
Police management itself must organize training and remain primarily
responsible for control of the individual officer's discretionary decisions.
Nonetheless, the legal and political values embodied in training must come
from the outside. Realistically, the extensive guidelines required for effective
training (as well as the necessary investment of resources) place these matters
beyond the capacity of smaller localities. Legislative direction is desirable,
since the necessary detail entailed in the substantive law indicates the pedagogic unsuitability of after-the-fact case by case adjudication.
II
EXECUTIVE POWER AND ITS EXERCISE:

SUBSTANTIVE LAW THEORY

OF REVIEW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

The Federal Republic of Germany (and each of its constituent states, or
Lander) is a continental European administrative state. What does this mean
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to the American lawyer trained in a decentralized government of limited
powers? Beyond institutional organization, a very significant difference lies in
the scope of the state's powers and responsibilities with respect to its citizens.
As opposed to the United States' character as a liberal democracy with a government of limited powers, West Germany is a social democracy in which the
government is actively charged with ensuring the well-being of its citizens.
Americans are entitled only to nondiscrimination and to restraints on state
power so that the state will not unduly encroach on liberty or property interests. West German citizens are entitled to the state's active provision for their
well-being under the most modern view, but consequently are subject to the
appropriation of their interests for the well-being of others. Yet institutional
organization and state power are functionally related, since one is only the
incorporation of the other as the instrument of governance.
The preceding statements should remind the American lawyer that in
West Germany the relationship between the individual and the state (in the
form of the state's highly visible police) is different. Reduced to a practical
level, despite an unfortunate sociological tendency to lump the institutions of
modern industrial democracies together, the German "cop on the beat" is not
in the same position as his American counterpart.
The greater scope of state power, which has a historical basis, is harnessed
in West Germany by administrative law. For the American reader, the term
administrative law may be misleading; it implies a fairly narrow area of the law
arising in connection with the specialized jurisprudence of agency actions and
judicial review of those actions. By comparison, West German administrative
law is more broadly conceived as that area of law governing not only intragovernmental organization and actions but also the details of the relationship
between the individual and the state. 4 On the practitioner's level, West
German administrative law often approaches the American lawyer's sense of
constitutional law.
West German administrative law provides a forum for case by case adjudication of what is "due" process. 5 This approach to government actions and
discretion is implemented by the view that enforcement is merely a problem
of interpreting existing law, such interpretations being subject to judicial
review. 6 Central to the administrative law review process is the concept of the
"administrative act" (Verwaltungsakt), which may be generally defined as any
externalized act of a public authority affecting an individual in the area of
4.

See generally von MiInch, Verwaltung und Verwaltungsrecht im demokratischen und sozialen Rechtsstaat,

in ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT

1-54 (H. Erichsen & W. Martens 4th ed. 1979). See also infra

notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
5. On a functional level, West German administrative law has been characterized as closest in
spirit to American constitutional law. Without detracting from the current German federal constitution, this level of codified law dates back to the late nineteenth century in relatively developed form
and has survived modern German political and constitutional history-a roller coaster of monarchy,
revolution, dictatorship, and republics-with more lasting effect at the individual level.
6. This point is the antithesis of Professor Davis's position, reflecting in large part a simple
difference in his point of departure as an Anglo-American lawyer. See supra note 1.
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public law. 7 Limited chiefly by a concept related to mootness, 8 administrative
acts may be challenged within the administrative hierarchy of government and
thereafter are subject to judicial review. 9 West Germany employs courts of
special administrative jurisdiction in which individuals may pursue review of
administrative acts. These courts are busy.' 0
General administrative law standards of review incorporate doctrinal attitudes toward the complex problems of discretion in the enforcement mode of
administration. As a point of departure, modern West German law does not
recognize unbridled or free discretion (freies Ermessen). t t Technically, only
well-tempered discretion (pflichtgemdse Ermessensaustibung) is permissible,' 2
the limits of which are prescribed by the internal bounds of the statutes on
which it is based. Yet, what is "well-tempered" discretion as a matter of
law?13
Using the exercise of state police power (health, safety, and welfare) as an
example, we can observe the distinction made between the issue of whether
7.

See generally Erichsen & Martens, Das Verwaltungshandeln, in ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT

137-220 (H. Erichsen & W. Martens 4th ed. 1979).
8. A full technical analysis incorporates Rechtsschutzbedirfnis and special case rules, which are
neglected here.
9.

See generally Badura, Das Verwaltungsverfahren, in ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 267-337

(H. Erichsen & W. Martens 4th ed. 1979).
10. For example, in 1978 Baden-Wiirttemberg administrative courts disposed of 13,281 cases in
the first instance and on appeal. STATISTISCHES LANDESAMT BADEN-WURTrEMBERG, DAs RECHTSWESEN 1976 BIS 1978 111 (1980) (state census office publication vol. 266).
11. E.g., H. MAURER, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 89 (1980). In part a matter of semantics, modern views recognize the exercise of discretion but within the bounds of unbestimmte Rechtsbeg7iffe or Beurteilungsspielraum. Id. at 93-104. See also infra note 13.
12. E.g., POLIZEIGESETZ ofJanuary 16, 1968 [PoLG] § 3, Baden-Wirttemberg Gesetzblatt [GBI]
61, as amended.
13. One commentator formulates as follows:
Simultaneously staying within while fully exhausting the possibilities of the bounds of discretion
set forth in the law in question by balancing public against individual interests, while taking into
account only those factors which might be inferred from the law's policy (and ignoring others),
and adhering to principles of equal protection are the principal conditions for a correct exercise
of discretion.
Translation of:
Die Einhaltung und andererseits die voile Aussch6pfung der vom jeweiligen Gesetz bestimmten
Ermessensgrenzen durch Abwigung des 6ffentlichen mit dem Einzelinteresse, die Anwendung
dem Zweck der Ermichtigung entsprechender, also nicht sachfremder Erwigung und die Beachtung des Gleichheitsgrundsatzes sind die Hauptvoraussetungen fuir eine fehlerfreie
Ermessensentscheidung.
A. WITrERN, GRUNDRISS DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS 89 (1972).
While "well-tempered" discretion may be the best available translation, it fails to capture the
nuance of a more literal translation ofpflichtgemdss as "duty bound," which indicates external control.
Control is imposed by and derived from the law, under the rule of law. However, "duty bound
discretion," the more literal translation, is not preferable insofar as it contains the incongruity for
English speakers of purporting to limit the manner of exercise rather than the scope of discretion.
But is it "discretion" if the choices are limited and externally dictated? This linguistic tension
relating to connotations of the word discretion is perhaps best relieved by the use of "well-tempered," as long as the reader remains conscious that the tempering agent is what Professor Davis
called the extravagant version of the principle of the rule of law. See supra note 1. There remains a
sense among the minority of German administrative law scholars favoring Beurteilungsspielraum that
there are areas of unreviewable discretion, see infra note 11 and sources cited therein, but this position seems to be losing ground, e.g., H. MAURER, supra note 11, at 102-04, and is disfavored by the
courts, id. at 96-97.
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some action should be taken and the issue of which particular response
among many is appropriate. The West German administrative lawyer focuses
first on whether the elements of a disturbance of public order are present (an
analysis of the so-called Tatbestandsseite). 14 The corresponding reaction is
viewed as an open choice, since more than one response is typically available
under substantive law (an analysis of the so-called Rechtsfolgeseite). 15 Reference
to the police power, however, is only intellectual shorthand for the extent of
lawful state regulation of, and intrusion into, the affairs of individuals. Many
West German concepts that relate to public health, safety, and welfare or to
public order are admittedly open-ended, but are treated in legal doctrine as
indefinite legal norms (unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe) subject to full review and
adjudication. 16 The German response side analysis involves a judgmental
determination, but the parameters of discretion are the subject of substantive
administrative law doctrines recapitulated in constitutional restraints. In
practice, German courts recognize that there may be more than one right
answer in a given situation, but do not shy away from examining executive
actions on their merits while American courts often defer to separation of
powers.
The substantive law principles are deceptively easy to state, but are no less
involved in casuistic application than open-ended American constitutional
principles. Foremost among them is the principle of proportionality (Verhdltnismdssigkeitsprinzip).1 7 This principle includes a choice of the least intrusive
action (Ubermassverbot) and suitability (Geeignetheit)18 aimed at furthering the
purpose of the law in the application of which discretion is exercised. These
concepts provide standards for limited review of discretionary decisions. The
character and level of review far exceeds the "arbitrary and capricious" standard used by American courts reviewing agency actions. West German courts
will not reverse administrative decisions with the benefit of hindsight, but they
will test those decisions in light of available options at the time they were
made. The possibility of review remains significant, since under modern West
14.

See H.

KRITISCH DARGESTELLT AM BERLINER ASOG, AM MUSTER(1982) (practitioner's analysis). See also H. MAURER, supra note 11, at 86-93.
15. H. MAURER, supra note 11, at 86-93. A more theoretical if somewhat dated analysis is available in H. Schmatz, Die Grenzen des Opportunititsprinzips im heutigen deutschen Polizeirecht
(1966) (dissertation). Our analysis avoids the technical details of modem German inquiry such as
Putativgefahr,Anscheingefahr, and Beurteilungsspielraum as being an interesting but unnecessary detour
for purposes of this article. See also sources cited supra notes II & 13.
16. E.g., H. MAURER, supra note 11, at 93-98. See also supra notes 11-14.
17. See, e.g., Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032, 1034-35, 1039-43
(1983), for a description in English. Since German doctrine treats the proportionality principle as an
aspect of the Rechtsstaatsprnzip, K. HESSE, GRUNDZIGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND 29, 77 (12th ed. 1980), it may legitimately be considered as related to the American
"due process" concept.
18. In fact, these principles are elements of administrative law, see, e.g., I K. VOGEL,
WAGNER,

POLIZEIRECHT:

ENTWURF EINES EINHEITLICHEN POLIZEIGESETZES UND AN DER STPO 81-85

GEFAHRENABWEHR:

ALLGEMEINES

POLIZEIRECHT (ORDNUNGSRECHT)

DES BUNDES

UND

DER LANDER

135-73 (8th ed. 1975), so it is not necessary in typical cases to rise to the level of constitutional

analysis. It may be more palatable to the American lawyer when cast in these terms, since it looks too
much like substantive due process when viewed at the constitutional level.
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German law the individual has a right to the "correct exercise of discretion"
(fehlerfreie Ermessungsausiibung) in official action affecting him. At the extreme,
discretion disappears when the disturbance of public order is serious and the
response options are limited in number.' 9
Police are part of the administrative apparatus of governance and are generally subject to administrative law constraints. Thus, the availability of
outside review extends to many if not all actions of the police.2 0 Police
actions, whether discretionary or not, are theoretically subject to review by
superiors, the civilian administration, and the judiciary. Due to memories of
the Third Reich, the police are viewed critically by a significant segment of the
populace and frequently attract media attention. 2' The peculiar character of
rights, not only as protection against the government, but also as entitlements
to government action, also encourages many challenges for the failure to
22
act.
III
.THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Is the German policeman just another one of the "boys in blue" who happens to speak a foreign language? No, but the depth of difference with the
American experience first becomes apparent on examination of the institutional framework behind the individual officer. To place the preceding general treatment of discretion under German law in perspective, the police's
role within the administrative apparatus of government must be addressed.
To this end, a general description of the police is followed by a description of
the substantive law and institutions which delimit the legal boundaries of their
freedom of action in law enforcement.

19. See H. MAURER, supra note 11, at 92-93.
20. Until recently, courts declined to review many police actions, particularly those in the criminal procedure area, under a moomess analysis. This position has changed in the last decade. See
generally Reiss & Thyme, Rechtsschutz gegen strafprozessuale Zwangsmassnahmen, [19811 GoT-rDAMMER'S
ARCHIV 189 (criminal procedure); 2 K. VOGEL, supra note 18, at 361-423 (police law).
21. Talking with police management and examining local newspapers makes it apparent that
police coverage and letters to the editor in the form of complaints play a significant role in smaller
communities. While the larger city newspapers focus on more national and state news, the local
newspaper or local edition of the regional rural newspaper survives as an institution focusing on
community affairs.
22. The closest American analogs may be the class action civil rights suit directed against a
police department or, on rare occasions, federal investigations conducted by the Civil Rights Commission. Of course, the common wisdom among American litigators is that no police suit is complete
without a civil rights count in the complaint and a criminal defendant's counsel is guilty of prima
facie malpractice if he fails to make an exclusionary motion concerning evidence (if there is the barest
colorable claim of police misconduct). However, the American parallels aim somewhat higher at
egregious violations in individual instances, or at those involving patterns or practices if brought as
class actions.
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An Overview of the Structure of Police and Civil Administration in
Baden-Wiirttemberg

24
23
West German police are organized on the state level as civil servants.
The Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure are federal laws, while
administrative and police law matters are mostly retained under state jurisdiction. 2 5 The legal principles and practical observations about police in this
essay are largely based on the laws and police of the federal state of BadenWiirttemberg, 2 6 a jurisdiction located in the southwest corner of West Germany, approximately one and one-quarter times the size of Maryland, with a
1980 population of 9,190,052.27
It is instructive to note points of contrast between German police and their
American counterparts as well as to compare the organization of civil governments under which they serve. 28 As previously mentioned, the German police

23. See Appendix for schematic diagrams illustrating statewide organization and structure. The
statewide organization has been challenged at times, in particular following World War It when the
occupying powers tended to reorganize the police along the lines of their home countries as part of
general denazification efforts. The American zone included the northern areas of present-day
See 25 JAHRE
Baden-WUrttemberg, where they attempted to decentralize the police.
LANDESPOLIZEIDIREKTION

NORDBADEN:

ENTSTEHUNG

UND

ENTWICKLUNG

DER

LANDESPOLIZEI

IN

NORDBADEN NACH DEM 2. WELTKREIG 23 (1970) (police report). The traditional system has replaced

this foreign intrusion. See infra note 56. For a more general post-World War II picture of developments, see E. RAIBLE, GESCHICHTE DER POLIZEI: IHRE ENTWICKLUNG IN DEN ALTEN LANDERN BADEN
UND WURT-rEMBERG UND IN DEM NEUEN BUNDESLAND BADEN-WORTrEMBERG 107-94 (1963).
24. "Civil servant" is an inadequate translation of the German Beamter, since it lacks certain
attributes which place the Beamter in a special life-long relationship with the State (a public "company
man"). There is, however, no better English equivalent. The Beamter has a long history in governSee generally H.

ment as the heart of the administrative state.

HATrENHAUER, GESCHICHTE DES

(1980).
25. Technically speaking, criminal law and criminal procedure are areas in which, under a preemption analysis, either federal or state law may govern. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 74 (German Federal Constitution). Because the federal government has enacted laws, however, the states may not
act. GG art. 72. Many areas of special administrative concern are open to both federal and state law,
see GG art. 74, but general police law is left to the states since it is not among the exclusive or
competing areas ofjurisdiction. GG art. 70(I).
26. There are differences between the laws and police of the Federal Republic of Germany and
its constituent states, but they are similar, much like the laws and institutions of the corresponding
American jurisdictions are, if not more so. See generally E. Tschanett, Angleichungstendenzen im
deutschen Lnderpolizeirecht (1975) (dissertation). But see infra note 56. Given the historical predominance of Prussia and the role of its laws as the model for modern development, see infra notes
49-53 and accompanying text, much of the historical material herein draws on that model in lieu of
the formal development in historical Baden and Wiurttemberg. See E. RAIBLE, supra note 23, for a
non-lawyer's view of Baden-Wirttemberg history, and the sources cited in note 49 for legal analysis.
27. STATISTISCHES LANDESAMT BADEN-WORTrEMBERG, GEMEINDESTATISTIK 1980 (HEFT 1) 12
(1980) (state census office publication).
28. This comparison simply notes points in contrast with typical American jurisdictions, since
one can no more speak of "American" than "German" police. For information comparing conditions for police of the various German federal states, although dated in some respects, the best
BEAMTENTUMS

immediate source is probably C. HELFER & W.
BEAMTEN:

GUTACHTEN

IM AUFTRAG

SIEBEL, DAs BERUFSBILD DES POLIZEIVOLLZUGS-

DER STANDIGEN

KONFERENZ

DER INNENMINISTER

DER LANDER

(1975) (government commissioned study), while the most easily available special source for BadenWurttemberg may be the police's own reference and training manual, LANDESPOLIZEISCHULE &
FACHHOCHSCHULE

FUR

POLIZEI,

(looseleaf, updated constantly).
ORGANISATIONS-

UND

FOR
POLIZEI-HANDBUCH
See also G. ENDRUWEIT,

BERUFSSOZIOLOGISCHE

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND UND IN DEN USA

BADEN-WUiRTFEMBERG

STRUKTUR

UNTERSUCHUNGEN

(1979).

(9th ed.

1980)

UND WANDEL DER POLIZEI:

OBER

DIE

POLIZEI

IN

DER
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are organized on a statewide level in a civil service organization. Policemen
enjoy a lifelong career, and career incentives, including advancement possibilities, are significant. 29 Officers typically enter the police force before the
age of twenty and remain until their retirement at age sixty. Great pains are
taken in the initial selection and training of police cadets. 30 The cadets spend
several years alternating between the police academy, training units, and probationary periods on the job until they are finally accepted into the police
force as civil servants.
The police force is viewed as a professional organization, and there is very
little lateral movement in or out of this organization. Within the police force,
there is a pyramid structure consisting of three groups of ranks. 3' Promotion
within and between the groups is by merit. Policemen start as simple
patrolmen and advance through the ranks, with advancement between groups
awarded on a competitive basis. Usually, by the age of thirty it is clear
whether an individual will advance beyond the first rank group to middle
police management, and by the age of forty whether he will advance to the
third rank group of senior police management. 3 2 The most significant distinction at commencement of a police career and for several years thereafter is
whether a policeman is trained and assigned to the uniformed police or to the
33
detectives, which are separate organizations.
Within Baden-Wirttemberg, the police work in every conceivable environment. The same state police which are responsible for Stuttgart, a heavily
industrialized city comparable to regional population centers in the United
States, are also responsible for policing large rural areas dotted with small
towns. Uniformity of both police performance and standards across the entire
29. The statutory framework may be found chiefly in three sources: Landesbeamtengesetz of
August 8, 1979, Baden-Wiirttemberg GBI 398, as amended; Landeslaufbahnverordnung of February
15, 1971, Baden-Wiirttemberg GBI 27, as amended; and, on the negative side, Landesdiziplinarordnung of August 1, 1962, Baden-WUrttemberg GBI 141, as amended. Federal law is
also indirectly involved in the Rahmengesetz zur Vereinheitlichung des Beamtenrechts ofJanuary 3,
1977, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI], Teil I 21, as amended.
30. See, e.g., Polizei-Fiihrungsakademie Hiltrup, Auswahlverfahren fuir den Polizeivollzugsdienst-M6glichkeiten der Prognosen hinsichtlich der Bewahrung im Beruf (March 22-26, 1976)
(materials for seminar held for recruiting personnel at the national police academy); PolizeiFiihrungsakademie Hiltrup, Auswahlverfahren-Methoden und Erfahrungen (December 2-6, 1974)
(materials for seminar held for recruiting personnel at the national police academy).
31. Mittlerer Dienst, gehobener Dienst and h6herer Dienst. See infra note 34. The general legal requirements for each are set forth in the Landeslaufbahnverordnung of February 15, 1971, Baden-Wiirttemberg GBI 27 as amended.
32. The Landeslaufbahnverordnung of February 15, 1971, Baden-Wiirtemberg GBI 27. as
amended, sets the outer age limits as a legal matter since promotion between rank groups is subject
to maximum age restrictions, although in practice it may be clear well before the age of twenty-five
who is on the "fast track" (based on police academy grades and early personnel evaluations).
33. German police sociologists have concentrated on the views of recruits and their alleged
preference for detective service based on a feeling that the work is more varied and challenging.
While at least one study has found higher initial promotion rates for detectives, 3 C. HELFER & W.
SIEBEL, supra note 28, at 558-59, in the author's personal experience persons trained as detectives are
relatively rare at the level of senior police management in charge of both uniform and detective units.
This pattern may be the result of the detectives' relatively small number for early specializations,
which takes them out of consideration for general line command positions.
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state is achieved by administrative supervision through the government hierarchy and by the common basic training in police academies3 4 for the various
rank groups. Furthermore, there is constant personnel interchange that
reflects a direct relationship between seniority of rank and professional
mobility. While the lowest ranking group of officers tends quickly to reach
and remain in a specific locality, middle and especially senior police management may be moved around within regional governmental districts and, in
35
some cases, within the entire state.
The unified structure of local and state government affects the policing
environment in an unexpected fashion for the American lawyer accustomed to
decentralization. 36 The most significant source of local government power
may be the senior local officials' ex officio status and power as state represent37
atives for certain purposes.
The executive branch of state government in Baden-Wuirttemberg is structured on three levels. 38 The highest level contains the ministries, and their
statewide authority is based on the substantive areas for which they are
responsible. The state is divided into four geographic districts (Regierungsbezirke), each of which contains an area the size of several large American
counties. 3 9 The intermediate level of the general state administration
34. In Baden-Wiirttemberg, cadets seeking entry into the police at the level of patrolman (mittlerer Dienst) normally follow group tactics and basic training in the Bereitschaftspolizei by alternating
practical experience while on probationary status and more theoretical schooling at the
Landespolizeischule Freiburg. Candidates for the gehobener Dienst normally attend the Fachhochschule ffir
Polizei, Villingen-Schwenningen (the curriculum of which is published as R. SCHULTE,
FACHHOCHSCHULSTUDIUM

FOR DIE POLIZEI IN BADEN-WORTrEMBERG

(1980)).

Candidates for the

ho'herer Dienst attend the national police academy (Polizei-Fiihrungsakademie Hiltrup). As used in this
article the term "middle police management" typically refers to the middle-level rank group
(gehobener DTenst) and "senior police management" typically refers to the highest-level rank group
(hoherer Dienst). Although the police chief in towns in more rural areas remains a member of the
gehobener Dienst, he is also included in senior police management. Depending on the size of the town
and local police contingent, other senior commanders may also be included. The police are currently implementing a policy to staff the most senior officer positions in rural areas with personnel
from the hoherer Dienst by replacement at retirement.
35. The articulated ground for this movement is to produce police management which is knowledgeable about policing in all environments. While mobility cannot be forced on police as civil servants, the ambitious officer sees this as part of the "fast track." Its chief effect is to prevent an
ingrown atmosphere in many areas since senior police management and the middle level which is
"on the way up" are rotated between jobs and police stations.
36. The home rule municipality is foreign to West Germany. Local municipal government does

exist, but with sharply curtailed powers. See, e.g., art. 71(2)

VERFASSUNG BADEN-W(RTrEMBERG.

The

state government is responsible for many areas that the American lawyer customarily views as matters of local concern and control. See infra notes 38-41, 95-98 and accompanying text.
37. In Baden-Wiirttemberg, this results from the senior officials' character as Polizeibehorde. See
art. 71(2) VERFASSUNG BADEN-WURTTEMBERG. The nature of the police power is such that its exercise
is generally regulated by state police laws, such as PoLG. This general regulation is displaced in
specific instances by special laws such as those regulating emission of pollutants, contagious disease,
etc. E.g., W. Keil, Die Subsidiaritit des Polizeirechts: das Verhaitnis zwischen allgemeinem
Polizeirecht und besonderen gefahrabwehrenden Gesetzen (1972) (dissertation).
38. This statement ignores special agencies and similar entities, which are not material to this
inquiry. The general structure is dictated by the Landesverwaltungsgesetz of April 1, 1976, BadenWiirttemberg GBI. 325, as amended. The three-tier structure is shared by most of the German federal states. See generally H. MAURER, supra note 11, at 354-432.
39. Stuttgart is a special case insofar as its district includes the city itself as well as the normalsized administrative district. In practice, the city is split from the administrative district and is separately treated for most purposes. In this sense, there are five administrative units at the state level
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(Regierungsprdsidium)functions at the district level, and it provides general governmental services for the geographic area (internal divisions are specialized
by area of substantive responsibility). 4 0 On the lowest rung, the state administration is represented in rural areas at the county level (in the Landesratsamt)
and in urban areas at the municipality level (Kreisst'dte).4 t Organization of the
state police parallels the three tiers of general state government. 42
Representatives of the state government reach down to the localities
through successive layers of the administration and are aware of local concerns. A more senior level of the administrative hierarchy always monitors
local and regional representatives of the police and civilian departments. 4 3
This practice is supported in law by the superior administrative level's powers
of supervision and command (Aufsichtsbefugnisse and Weisungsbefugnisse) and the
subordinate administrative level's corresponding duty to supply sufficient
information (Unterrichtungspflicht) so the control function can be meaningfully
exercised.

B.

44

Influence of Substantive Law Structures on Public Safety and
Crimefighting Tasks of the Police

A specific examination of the institutional influences affecting the police
should begin with the legal basis of the organs of criminal justice and public
order: the courts, prosecutors, police, and the secondary bureaucratic level of
government. A basic caveat is in order: like those of other continental European countries, the West German law enforcement system conceives as separate the tasks of maintaining order and fighting crime. These tasks are
governed by different bodies of statutory law. 4 5 Depending on the law being
enforced, the same governmental organ enjoys powers differing not only in
46
degree but also in kind.
(this is literally true for the police, since there are separate Landespolizeidirektionen in Stuttgart for the
city and general administrative district). PoLG § 64
40. The organizational chart for such an entity is reproduced in H. MAURER, supra note 11, at
560. See also supra note 38.
41. PoLG § 48.
42. See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
43. This is a function of hierachical structure as a matter of hornbook law, but is normally regulated for public safety matters concerning civilian authorities by POLG §§ 49-50 and for the police by
PoLG §§ 58-60. For supervision of police in criminal investigations, see the sources cited in note 44.
The schematic diagrams in the Appendix illustrate the organization of supervision.
44. POLG §§ 51, 61-62 (for police law). For criminal investigations involving the peculiar relationship between police and prosecutor, see notes 60-68 and accompanying text; Richtlinien ftir das
Strafverfahren und das Bussgeldverfahren, effective January 1, 1977, [RISTBV], Allgemeine
Verftigung desJustizministeriums of November 19, 1976, §§ 1, 3 and Anhang A. See also F. G6rgen,
Die organisationsrechtliche Stellung der Staatsanwaltschaft zu ihren Hilfsbeamten und zur Polizei
(1973) (dissertation).
45. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; infra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
46. In an extreme example, if a person is kidnapped and the police were to search an apartment
for evidence of the kidnapper's identity, this repressive activity is subject to criminal procedure constraints and requirements for criminal search and seizure. If, however, the police believe that the
kidnapped victim is in a certain area and conduct searches to free him, this preventive activity to
preserve public safety is subject only to police law restraints on searches. The police law search is
not subject to the same specificity requirements and may be conducted over a wide area (for
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Modern police derive the substantive scope of their powers from the institution-the public prosecutor or civilian state authorities-under whose
authority, and subject to whose directives, they act. Thus, a practical measure
of police discretion at the institutional level is the extent to which the police
do not function under direct control of the governmental entity from which
their authority is derived. In practice, there is an observable migration of
47
decisional authority to police at this institutional level.

The deep historical roots of the governmental institutions are important to
an understanding of the modern crimefighting/peacekeeping dichotomy.
The jurisdictional lines of this dichotomy are the result of historical institutions-inquisitorial courts and absolutist governments-against which
modern West German laws are a reaction. 4 8 A little history is quite helpful in
explaining this apparently counterintuitive dichotomy to the American lawyer,
and its internalization is necessary to a full understanding of how German
police analyze their legal options in a law enforcement context.
1. Historical Peacekeeping Function and the Public Good. The development of
the law of
public order serves as the basis of the modern German concept of
"police."'4 9 During the supremacy of absolutist rule prior to the second half
of the nineteenth century, "police" referred to the entire governmental
administration. 50 Its power over subjects was absolute since officials acted as
personal agents of the monarch.
example, allapartments in a building where police believe a victim is held).
POLIZEICESETZ FUR BADEN-WURTrEMBERG

MIT ERLAUTERUNGEN

See, e.g., R. BELZ,

UND ERG.ANZENDEN

VORSCHRIFrEN

143-44 (2d ed. 1979) (comments 11-13 to POLG § 25(2)2(3)). This type of distinction, and the
tension created if the different underlying tasks are not clearly separated, is evident from time to time
in the American caselaw's handling of issues relating to regulatory searches (such as the warrant
requirement in the context of building inspections or OSHA violation inspections).
47. See infra notes 80-81, 111-16 and accompanying text.

48. See sources cited infra note 61; see also infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
49. H. MAIER, DIE ALTERE DEUTSCHE STAATS- UND VERWALTUNGSLEHRE (2d ed. 1980), traces the
development in detail. This "police state" or "welfare state" (Polizeistaat; Wohlfahrtsstaat) exercised
absolute power over the life of the subject; the Executive's own opinion was irrefutable regarding
what served both the State's well-being and that of the individual. See also V. G6TZ, ALLGEMEINES
POLIZEI- UND ORDNUNGSRECHT 11-16 (6th ed. 1980). From its early modern development period
until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the entire state administration was considered to be
the "police," as an extension of the state's own power. See note 67 and sources cited therein for the
historical interplay between the power of the state and administrative competence. As the modern
state was organized as an administrative state, the police power was institutionalized in the branches
of bureaucracy responsible for certain subject matter. There was no unitary "police force" in the
American sense, but rather, in a technical sense, "police" for enforcing construction ordinances, for
enforcing occupational laws, and so forth.
The development is traced in Prussia, the politically crucial north German state which eventually
became the center of the German Empire and which was the equivalent of a leading jurisdiction.
While other German states, such as the then separate states of Baden and Wiirttemberg have separate but related histories see, e.g., sources cited supra note 23; sources cited in V. GOTZ, supra at 12; H.
Ross, Generalklausel und Spezialermachtigung nach baden-wurttembergischem Polizeirecht (1962)
(dissertation), Prussian development should loosely be considered as constitutional development.
Specifically Prussian developments may be best followed in K. WOLZENDORFF, DER POLIZEGEDANKE
DES MODERNEN

STAATS:

EIN VERSUCH

ZUR ALLGEMEINEN VERWALTUNGSLEHRE

UNTER BESONDERER

BERijCKSICHTIGUNG DER ENTWICKLUNG IN PREUSSEN (1918 & photo. reprint 1964).
50. See H. MAIER, supra note 49, at 92-104. From the historical perspective,

the meaning of
"police" is significant for the social change underlying the movement from feudal to modern state.
Id.
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Foreshadowing the modern state, during the Enlightenment period the
monarchy abandoned the absolutist idea of the ruler as the center of the state
and replaced it with the new idea that a monarch is the first servant of the
state, a trustee for the people subject to the rule of law. 5 ' This reform conviction evidenced itself in the Prussian General State Law, Aligemeine Landesrecht,
of 1794, the theoretical background for the organization of a modern admin52
istrative state.
The most important element of the Prussian General State Law for these
purposes is contained in Section 10, II 17, defining the new rule of the
German concept of "police" (which includes the general and civil administration): "The police are charged with the duty to take such measures as are
necessary to maintain public peace, safety, and order and to protect the public
5 3 This legislation is crucial,
or its individual members from present danger."
forming the model and point of departure for modern German police law
(Polizeirecht), which is simultaneously the ancestor of and part of modern
German administrative law. Police law is controlled by discretionary principles in its application (Opportunitditsprinzip).54 It is subject, however, to the pre51. H. CONRAD, DIE GEISTIGEN GRUNDLAGEN DES ALLGEMEINEN LANDRECHTS FOR DIE PREUSSISCHEN STAATEN VON 1794, at 19-24 (1958).
52. Id. See generally K. WOLZENDORFF, supra note 49. The nascent departure of the Prussian
police law from the Polizeistaat or Wohlfahrtsstaat suffered a setback in the reactionary period following
the French Revolution. Through regulations and legislation in 1808 and 1850, the power of the state
was indirectly reextended to cover the individual's welfare, in contradiction to the 1794 legislation
restricting protection from danger and maintenance of public order. See V. G6TZ, supra note 49, at
11-16. The more restrictive view of 1794 again found acceptance in the late nineteenth century in
the Kreuzberger Judgment. Id. at 13-14. But see P. PREU, POLIZEIBEGRIFF UND STAATSZWECKLEHRE
315-19 (1983).
53. Translation of "Die n6thigen Anstalten zur Erhaltung der 6ffentlichen Ruhe, Sicherheit und
Ordnung und zur Abwendung der, dem Publiko, oder einzelnen Mitgliedem desselben bevorstehenden Gefahr zu treffen, ist das Amt der Polizei." This rule is paralleled in present day POLG

§ l(1) as
Die Polizei hat die Aufgabe, von dem Einzelnen und dem Gemeinwesen Gefahren abzuwehren,
durch die die 6ffentliche Sicherheit oder Ordnung bedroht wird, und St6rungen der 6ffentlichen
Sicherheit oder Ordnung zu beseitigen, soweit es im 6ffentlichen Interesse geboten ist. Sie hat
insbesondere die verfassungsmassige Ordnung zu schuitzen und die ungehinderte Ausubiung
der staatsbiirgerlichen Rechte zu gewaihrleisten.
This section can be translated,
The police has the task of protecting individuals and the community from dangers through
which public safety or order are threatened and of rectifying disturbances of public safety or
order insofar as is required by the public interest. In particular, the police is charged with protection of the constitutional order and is bound to secure the unhindered exercise of citizens'
rights.
("Police," in the sense of the POLIZEIGESETZ, encompasses both the institutional and the substantive
concepts of police. See infra note 56.)
Disregarding for the moment special statements affirming protection of citizens' rights from third
party encroachment, the modern form does not incorporate substantial changes. In fact, the modern
police law statute tends to include only refinements to the original concept of the statute. More than
anything else, this modern formulation is the codification of caselaw explications of older statutes in
nonarchaic language. There is, however, a significant distinction on the political side, as political
disorders were considered public disturbances under older law.
54. E.g., I K. VOGEL, supra note 18, at 135-72. In fact, German law itself recognizes so many
exceptions in the criminal law area, seeJ. BAUMANN, GRUNDBEGRIFFE UND VERFAHRENSPRINZIPIEN DES
STRAFPROZESSRECHTS 49-56 (3d ed. 1979), that some academic commentators think the exceptions
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viously discussed requirement of general administrative law that discretion be
55
"well-tempered.
In the twentieth century, administrative agencies of the state were separated from the enforcement arm of the police force. 5 6 As the general state
have overwhelmed the rule, e.g., Schr6der, Legalitts-und Opportunittsprnzipheute, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR
KARL PETERS 411-27 (1974). From an American perspective, however, the rule still predominates.
55. E.g., 1 K. VOGEL, supra note 18, at 135-72. See generally supra notes 11-16 and accompanying
text.
56. The specific tasks of suppressing street crime and the maintaining public order led to the
creation of uniformed police (Sicherheitspolizei or, in the modern terminology, Schutzpolizei) in a
number of German states around 1800. The role of this particular police was prospective: to keep
the peace and prevent crime. The relatively modern investigative police (Kriminalpolizei), specializing
in the retrospective analysis of committed crimes, was only gradually introduced in the second half of
the nineteenth century, at which time it was separated organizationally from the peacekeeping force
and put under the direction of the prosecutor to assist in his work as "auxiliaries." See infra notes 6568 and accompanying text. As an organizational matter, the Schulzpolizei has taken over investigations
of petty crimes. For that reason, detectives work only on more substantial matters in the modern
police.
The development of law enforcement agencies must be envisioned as a parallel to the changing
ideas of the state's power to police, the concept of administrative agencies as "police," and the coincident change from the older inquisitorial courts to the modern continental criminal procedure. See
supra notes 49, 52 and accompanying text; infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. The last days of
the inquisitorial courts and the rise of a police force overlapped. In Berlin, on the leading edge of
police development, the majority of the investigative duties of the inquisitorial court in crime fighting
were transferred to the nascent investigative branch of the police force. Only the introduction of the
prosecutor in the reform system several decades later brought supervision to the police who were his
"auxiliaries." See generally sources cited infra note 60. This reform of the equivalent of the American
pretrial investigation was necessitated in part by the misbehavior of the police in the intervening
period, as well as by the dissatisfaction with the inquisitorial procedure. See generally infra notes 60-61
and sources cited therein. The tendency of police to overreach and to disregard the balance of the
law in criminal investigations was to be checked by a prosecutor whose quasi-judicial role and duties
set him apart from a comparable American figure. The supervision of the remainder of the police
force was undertaken in part by the general state government (the peacekeeping function), and in
part by those specific agencies whose "police power" regulations were implicated (health ordinances,
building codes, and so forth, to the full extent of the power to police).
The final stage in German police development followed the collapse of the Third Reich, during
which the police forces of German states had been nationalized, centralized, and brutally employed
against opponents of national socialism. The victorious allies dismantled the existing police apparatus and attempted to decentralize police forces from the national to the local levels with the recreation of federal states, as a response to the perceived dangers of a totalitarian state. This process
has now largely been reversed, see supra note 23, and present German police forces are centrally
organized at the state level. A more lasting change was achieved in the postwar reorganization of the
organs still referred to as police, according to the tradition that the entire government apparatus was
the "police." See supra note 49. Many specific agencies with regulatory tasks analogous to the American "police power" were separated completely from the older structure as independent agencies.
The theoretical depth and characterization of this separation is one of the actively debated issues that
distinguish the German jurisdictions. The splits between jurisdictions, see supra note 26; H. Scupin,
Die Entwicklung des Polizeibegriffs und seine Verwendung in den neuen deutschen Polizeigesetzen
(1970) (dissertation), are based in an older north-south division of jurisdictions aggravated by
Entpolizeilichung reforms mandated by the occupation forces after World War II, but the argument
(while politically charged) affects practice very little. The minority jurisdictions, most recently represented chiefly by Bavaria, have adopted laws in which the term "police" designates only the law
enforcement agency familiar to Americans. This action is not surprising, since Bavaria was in the
American zone immediately following the war. The traditional viewpoint (substantially adhered to in
Baden-Wiirttemberg, id. at 135-38) largely follows the older Prussian model that "police" is substantively synonymous in scope with the German equivalent of "police power," and it treats designation
of enforcement organs as a jurisdictional problem of decisional competence. A third group ofjurisdictions effectively employs the Prussian model but more clearly separates the civilian agencies with
primary decisional competence in public safety matters (Ordnungsbehorden). See generally W. MARTENS,
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administration, the state agencies are "police authorities" (Polizeibehrde),5 7
but are institutionally separate (as civilian entities) from the law enforcement
agencies (Vollzugspolizei)58 empowered to execute their directives. 59
2. Historical Crimefighting Function. The modern German institutions of
courts and prosecutors 60 were created at the beginning of the nineteenth century essentially by splitting the office of inquisitorial judge into an accusatory
prosecution element and an impartial adjudicatory element. 6 1 The prosecutor lost the power of an inquisitorial judge to convict the accused, and was
WANDLUNGEN DES POLIZEIBEGRIFFS, GENERALKLAUSEL UND SPEZIALERMACHTIGUNGEN, DIE GENERALERMACHTIGUNG ZUR GEFAHRENABWEHR, POLIZEIPFLICHTIGE PERSONEN (8th ed. 1977); H. Scupin

supra; E. Tschanett, supra note 26. The doctrinal categories employed in discussion are commonly
the substantive, institutional, and formal police concepts (materielle, institutionelle, and formelle
Polizeibegriffe). What is in a name? The political direction of the technical debate is that, by adhering
to older Prussian categories, law enforcement agencies enjoy powers of civil government, which is
disturbing to Germans for historical reasons related to the exercise of state power. In practice, the
categories of discussion appear not to make a substantial difference in how law enforcement agencies
interface with the civilian administration. Through adoption of the Musterentwurf see supra note 2, or
a substantial part of its provisions, the state police laws (including Bavaria's) may be converging now
more than ever.

57.
58.

E.g., PoLG §§ 47-51.
E.g., PoLG §§ 56-62.

59. The more modern view in German police law attempts to dispose entirely with a separate
substantive concept for the police; however, for the American reader the underlying structural separation of the police tasks (maintenance of order and the suppression of crime) is what remains important. See supra note 56.
60. From the Renaissance until the late Enlightenment, the law enforcement function of today's
German prosecutors and criminal courts was chiefly performed by inquisitorial courts. See J.
LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE (1974). Seventeenth and eighteenth century
German legal thought did have a substantive concept of "police." Under that concept, however, the
entire administrative apparatus of the state was viewed as an extension of the absolutist ruler. See
supra note 49 and sources cited therein. The inquisitorial court largely conducted its own investigation into criminal matters with the assistance of a few bailiffs. Investigations were commonly limited
to extracting a confession under torture, since there were no organized police to examine witnesses
not under the direct control of the court. See Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining,46 U. CHI. L. REV.
3 (1978). See also F. G6RGEN, supra note 44, at 35-60, for a more general historical inquiry about
police-judge and police-prosecutor relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth century period. A
more polarized historical picture of the relationship is presented by A. WAGNER, DER KAMPF DER
JUSTIZ GEGEN DIE VERWALTUNG IN PREUSSEN (1936).
Uniformed regular police only developed
toward the end of the eighteenth century in cities such as Berlin, see generally W. OBENAUS, DIE
ENTWICKLUNG

DER PREUSSISCHEN SICHERHEITSPOLIZEI

BIS ZUM ENDE DER REAKTIONSZEIT

(1940),

although their beginnings may be traced back to the Landreiter and city watches.

61. E.g., H. ZACHARIA, DIE GEBRECHEN UND DIE REFORM DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFVERFAHRENS,
DARGESTELLT AUF DER BASIS EINER CONSEQUENTEN ENTWICKLUNG DES INQUISITORISCHEN UND DES
ACCUSATORISCHEN PRINZIPS (1846); see also E. Carsten, Die Geschichte der Staatsanwaltschaft in
Deutschland bis zur Gegenwart: Ein Beitrag zur Reform des Strafprozesses (1932) (dissertation); K.
Elling, Die Einftihrung der Staatsanwaltschaft in Deutschland, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Strafprozesses (1911) (dissertation). This reform was instituted gradually in a number of German states
prior to Unification and reached its conclusion in the 1877 Reich Code of Criminal Procedure, which
is still in force in West Germany as federal law, albeit in much amended form. The prosecutor
received a monopoly on the pursuit and prosecution of crime (Anklagemonopol); the investigative and
charging authority of the inquisitorial judge was denied to the new judiciary, who nonetheless
remained distinguishable from their common law brethren. Although his pretrial investigative role
was largely lost to the prosecutor, the new German judge retained the chief forensic role at trial as
well as an independent duty to clarify the events (Aufkldrungspflicht) underlying the prosecution; he is
a more active character than the Anglo-American judge serving as "referee" in an adversarial trial.
For a current English language treatment, see J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
GERMANY

(1977).
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assigned as a counterweight to his charging monopoly the duty to investigate and prosecute all suitable crimes (Legalitdtsprinzip or the principle of
compulsory prosecution 6 2). 63 The prosecutor in the new system retained
responsibility for the physical investigation of suspected crimes. 64 The uniformed police had no direct investigative power or duty comparable to that of
65
the prosecutor.
The subjugation of the police to the office of the prosecutor is crucial to an
understanding of the German public law concept of the police's role in
crimefighting. The Code of Criminal Procedure, empowering investigative
measures such as searches, seizures, and arrests, strikes a compromise
regarding the activities of police. It directs that "auxiliaries of the prosecutor" (Hilfsbeamte der Staatsanwaltschaft66) act under the prosecution's direction in investigating crimes. As such, the auxiliaries are subject to the
Legalittitsprinzip, which in theory is a denial of discretion. 6 7 Historically, who
62. This principle has been treated in English at length in connection with the plea bargainingprosecutor's discretion debate. See, e.g., J. LANGBEIN, supra note 61, at 87-109; Jescheck, The Discretionary Powers of the ProsecutingAttorney in Western Germany, 18 AM.J. COMP. L. 508 (1970); Goldstein &
Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitional" Systems: France, Italy and Germany, 87
YALE L.J. 240 (1977); Langbein & Weinreb, ContinentalCriminalProcedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE
L.J. 1549 (1978), and sources cited therein. While treated as hornbook law, e.g., J. BAUMANN, supra
note 54, at 47-56, the principle is still the subject of discussion and challenge in Germany. See, e.g., T.
Weigend, Anklagepflicht und Ermessen: die Stellung des Staatsanwalts zwischen Legalitits- und
Opportunitatsprinzip nach deutschem und amerikanischem Recht (1978) (dissertation); Schr6der,
supra note 54, at 411-27.
63. To fulfill this function the prosecutor assembled the dossier (investigative and litigation
file), on the basis of which the judge would conduct the open court portion of the trial. The American reader might best visualize this in one of several criminal procedure handbooks explaining the
conduct of a criminal case by exemplary use of a file. E.g., G. SCHAFER, DIE PRAXIS DES
STRAFVERFAHRENS AN HAND EINER AKTE: DAS VERFAHREN IN ERSTER INSTANZ (2d ed. 1980). In
German legal thought the "trial" extends from the very beginning of the prosecutor's investigation
(with three stages as a matter of hornbook law, the Vor-, Zwischen-, and Hauptverfahren), and in substance it is often concluded by the time proceedings in open court are commenced. The public trial
is preserved for both political and legal doctrinal reasons, but the American lawyer should recall that
the German judge has a full litigation file before him as a finder of fact while proceedings in open
court take place.
64. The prosecutor still retains responsibility, see RISTBV §§ 1, 3(I), although in practice he
relies on police work. E.g., W.

STEFFEN, ANALYSE

POLIZEILICHER ERMITrLUNGSTATIGKEIT AUS DER

267-68 (1976).
65. Instead, the 1877 Reich Code of Criminal Procedure assigned powers and duties to the
prosecutor and in some graver cases to an independent investigating judge. The office of the investigative judge (borrowed from French law) has since been abolished. The prosecutor is now solely
responsible for criminal investigations. But see infra note 118.
66. Who shall be such an officer is a question relegated to state law by section 152 of the Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz of January 27, 1877, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 41, as amended. Cadets and
senior police management (above a certain rank) are excluded by law from the prosecutor's auxiliaries. The heart of the compromise left open the choice whether the prosecution would form its own
team of investigators to prepare cases, or whether it would adopt the nascent police as auxiliaries.
See supra note 56.
67. Much of American law that covers traffic or minor offenses is technically decriminalized in
West Germany, however, and infractions are subject to discretionary pursuit by adminstrative
authorities and prosecutors. Historically, the German substantive law forbidding certain acts was
contained in two bodies of law: criminal codes and police offenses codes. The two bodies of law
were grounded in different historical jurisdictions (police law and the jurisdiction of police law courts
rested with local princes, while criminal law was a national matter for the monarch's courts) and so
varied at different times in different places. However, in general criminal offenses were more serious
SICHT DES SPATEREN STRAFVERFAHRENS

Page 185: Autumn 1984]

BADEN-WURTTEMBERG

these "auxiliaries" would be was left to state law, but the police were chosen.
Currently, police officers acting as prosecutorial auxiliaries are institutionally
but not theoretically separate from the prosecutor when acting under his
68
authority but not his direct command.
IV
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTERPLAY WITHIN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY

Depending upon whether he acts in a crimefighting or peacekeeping
capacity, the German policeman faces situations in which either the law recognizes no discretion or the law expressly recognizes discretion but limits it to
"well-tempered" discretion. Dividing law enforcement activities into
peacekeeping and crimefighting aspects also channels supervising authority.
The exercise of discretion may be found on two levels of analysis of the
internal control function.
At an institutional level, police management has attempted to establish the
police force as independent of the civilian administration and the prosecutor's
office. 69 Further, by ministerial directive, personnel at the senior level of
police management hold offices in the intermediate levels of the civilian police
authorities, 70 thus breaching the strict separation of police and civil adminis7
tration in the review function. '
On the operational level of policemen on the beat, empirical studies document their tendency to find a policing role in peacekeeping more often than in
violations. The police offenses were theoretically similar to both modern American minor offenses
and administrative health and safety regulations which punish violations of laws promulgated under
the "police power." See, e.g., W. VON DER HEYDE, POLIZEI-STRAFGEWALT IN DEN KONIGLICH PREUSSISCHEN STAATEN, ODER AUCH DARSTELLUNG DES VERHALTNISSES DER POLIZEIGEWALT ZU DER JUSTIZGEWALT, DER AUSUBUNG DES POLIZEI-STRAFRECHTS, UND DER HANDLUNGEN, WELCHE ZU DEN
POLIZEI-STRAFFLLEN GEHOREN (1837). These old German police offenses, however, exceed the
scope of American administrative offenses, since the then current German concept of "police"
exceeded the American idea of "police power." See supra note 49; P. PREU, supra note 52. The
German statutory developments are best followed in H. MATrFES, UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR LEHRE VON
ORDUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN:
ERSTER HALBBAND,
GESCHICHTE UND RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 5-182
(1977). The scope of German police offenses included not only the typical American elements of
health, safety, and welfare in regulating industry, etc., but also the lower level of criminal offense.
The police power enactment lives on in modern law in the Polizeiverordnungen, POLG §§ 10-18a, a
technical violation of the separation of powers doctrine touching on our theme in the question of
who makes law.
68. The legal tension inherent in this "neither fish nor fowl" status is best captured in F.
GORGEN, supra note 44. See also infra note 118.
69. See infra notes 78-81, 111-16 and accompanying text. The organizational subjugation of
police to prosecutors has been a particular sore point with police for a number of years, as witnessed
by numerous articles in professional journals catering to police. See, e.g., W. STEFFEN, supra note 64,
at 52-53. Police dissatisfaction may be beside the point in the criminal area, since in modern criminal
trial handbooks (often written by and for younger judges and prosecutors as introductions to practice) the independence of police is accepted as a fact. E.g., E. SCHLUCHTER, DAS STRAFVERFAHREN 66
(1981). Some commentators, while acknowledging this fact, are less happy with this state of affairs.
E.g., G. SCHXFER, supra note 63, at 155. A review of the schematic diagrams in the Appendix, entitled
The Organization of the Police in Baden-W6urttemberg and Police Supervision in Baden-Wilrttemberg, is recommended as an aid to visualizing the interrelation and formal paths of interaction
DEN

between police authorities and the police force.

70.
71.

See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
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crimefighting. 72 By treating crimefighting functions as peacekeeping matters,
policemen exchange the supervision of the prosecutor for the supervision of
civilian police authorities. Through the establishment of the law enforcement
agency's institutional independence and the sharing of senior personnel with
civilian authorities, however, a certain amount of the civilian authorities'
supervision is already exchanged for internal supervision within the law
enforcement agency.
A.

Crimefighting: The Public Prosecutor and Police-Accountability for
Conduct of the Criminal Investigation and Trial

The modern German criminal investigation and trial is influenced by three
institutions: the police, the prosecutor, and the court. In theory, discretion is
squeezed out of the criminal justice system by the Legalitdtsprinzip, or at least is
reserved primarily in the hands of the judiciary. Police involvement as
prosecutorial auxiliaries is already a tertiary role. Yet, despite their theoretical subsidiary status, the police are in practical control of the pretrial investigation. This fact raises immediate questions about discretion concerns in two
areas: (1) whether the Legalitdtsprinzip is applied consequently (and whether
crimes are charged); and (2) how investigations are conducted.
The office of the German public prosecutor and the principle of compulsory prosecution have attracted American academic interest in connection
with the plea bargaining-prosecutorial discretion controversy. 73 Concerns of
ancillary prosecutorial discretion and the statewide hierarchical organization
of the prosecutorial corps 74 impinge upon a discussion of police discretion,
yet the limited scope of this article permits only reference to this literature
instead of its reexamination in detail. The American literature's discussions
of the German prosecutor and his role in crimefighting, however, suffer from
an interpretive bias imposed by implicit comparison to the American prosecutor. The nature and role of participants in the pretrial investigatory phase
are sometimes lost in this treatment.
The German trial may be viewed as coextensive with the criminal investigation, which is treated as one of the trial stages as a matter of hornbook
law. 75 The Legalitdtsprinzip compels commencement of proceedings; however,
the trial begins to take shape when the equivalent of a probable cause determination is made. It unfolds during the investigation under the judicial
branch, since the prosecutor is institutionally descended from ajudge 76 and is
See, e.g., J. FEEST & E. BLANKENBURG, DIE DEFINITIONSMACHT DER POLIZEI: STRATEGIEN DER
(1972).
73. See the English language sources cited in note 62 for an entry into the literature.
74. E.g., E. SCHLUCHTER, supra note 69, at 45-65. See also sources cited infra note 82.
75. See supra note 63. The terms Vorverfahren and Ermittlungsverfahren are basically interchangeable, although the former places the criminal investigation in perspective as part of a broader whole
while the latter focuses on function.
76. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
72.

STRAFVERFOLGUNG UND SOZIALE SELEKTION 86-93, 132-33
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currently considered an officer of the court with broad investigative powers.
In practice, the police exercise these powers.
The prosecutor remains responsible for the early stages of the "trial," but
due to high crime rates and personnel shortages he is no longer in clear control of the investigative portion. 77 The police apprehend offenders, develop
case files and forward them to the prosecutor when the criminal information
(Anklage) is to be filed. 78 The chief role of a prosecutor is now in the actual

trial, its immediate preparation, and control of the charging decision.
Because of limited manpower, the public prosecutor's office can exercise
meaningful investigative supervision only regarding serious offenses, and
then only by giving the police general directives concerning who is to be interrogated, what witnesses should supply written statements, and so forth. 79
Current scholarship has called into question police support for the principle of compulsory prosecution. 80 The prosecutor can only act on the basis
of evidence resulting from investigations that he no longer actually conducts.
Thus, the prosecutor will fail to bring charges for lack of evidence to the
extent that police neglect to investigate crimes they regard as less serious or
less promising in terms of conviction (which may be a rational decision to
8t
allocate limited manpower resources).
Prosecutors and police management stress the effect of potential judicial
and administrative review as an incentive in their pursuit of investigations.
The Legalit'tspnnzip does not require charging where no conviction may be
obtained due to lack of evidence, but a decision by the prosecutor to close any
investigation is reviewable by his superiors at both the local and appellate
court levels.8 2 As in the general administration, the affected citizen may make
a formal administrative complaint. 83 The prosecutorial hierarchy's decision is
subject to judicial review. Also, certain individuals have standing to challenge
the failure of the prosecutor (and indirectly the police) to pursue alleged
offenses. The equivalent of a mandamus action (Klageerzwingungsverfahren) lies4
8
to challenge the failure of the prosecutor to pursue an alleged infraction,
while a variety of offenses related to obstruction of justice are applicable
to both police and prosecutor.8 5 Within these parameters, neglecting the
77. This proposition assumes that the prosecutor was at some time in full control, a historical
position on which commentators differ. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 60-61.
78. See supra note 69.
79. RiSTBV §§ 3(I), 3(11); see also W. STEFFEN, supra note 64, at 267-68.
80. See infra notes 124-55 and accompanying text.
81. E.g., W. STEFFEN, supra note 64, at 259-89, 294.
82. RISTBV §§ 88-105. The legal aspects of the prosecutorial structure are concisely presented
in E. SCHLUCHTER, supra note 69, at 45-65, while the empirical functioning of the prosecutor's office
as a part of the criminal justice system is best captured by E. BLANKENBURG, K. SESSAR & W. STEFFEN,
DIE STAATSANWALTSCHAFT IM PROZESS STRAFRECHTLICHER SOZIALKONTROLLE (1978). For the reader

familiar with the substantive law there is a "how to" manual for law clerks and new prosecutors
providing insight into day to day operations, F. KUNIGK, DIE STAATSANWALTSCHAFIrLICHE TATIGKEIT:
EINFUHRUNG MIT MUSTERVERFUGUNGEN (2d ed. 1978).

83.

See infra note 109 and accompanying text.

84.

Strafprozessordnung STPO § 172; RiSTBV § 105.

85.

For example, Strafvereitelung im Amt or Rechtsbeugung and potentially other of the so-called

Amtsverbrechen.
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investigation/trial is itself a violation of the law.
Beyond the Legalitdtspnnzip, the conduct of criminal investigations by
German police involves choices among courses of conduct raising concerns
similar to those addressed by the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments to the
United States Constitution.8 6 The contours of threshold determinations for
police measures (searches, seizures, and arrests) are beyond the scope of this
article although the constellations of probable cause, subsidiary conditions,
and the permitted extent of such measures differ significantly from those of
the United States. They are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which assigns responsibility for criminal investigations to the public prosecutor, theoretically reserving for the judge the power to order arrests,
searches, and seizures.8

7

Yet, the power to undertake these actions in crim-

inal investigations is a practical subject of police discretion insofar as police
make the operative decisions.8 8
The clearest analogy to the German supervision requirement may be the
American warrant requirement, by which the power to make certain decisions
is denied to the police. The Code of Criminal Procedure empowers varying
combinations of judges, prosecutors, and prosecutors' auxiliaries (police) to
order searches, seizures, and arrests under given circumstances.8 9 In general,
the Code of Criminal Procedure presupposes an image of the criminal investigation in which the judge dominates, the prosecutor is empowered to act
under "exigent circumstances," and the police may act for the prosecutor in a
more restricted set of cases. In both the Code of Criminal Procedure and
state police laws, various provisions allow law enforcement officers to act
86. The values and protected rights of the fourth and fifth amendments are contained in several
articles of the current German Federal Constitution: Articles 1 and 2(1) of the GG provide protection of "human dignity" and "personality," roughly corresponding to the diverse interests protected
by American "privacy"; Article 2(2) of the GG protects the individual in his freedom and bodily
integrity, corresponding to American searches and seizures of the person; Article 10 of the GG protects the confidentiality of post and telecommunications, corresponding to the American wire-tapping and postal seizure jurisprudence; and article 13 of the GG protects the sanctity of the dwelling,
corresponding roughly to the classic arena of the exclusionary rule. These rights may be reasonably
restricted but not fully impaired by laws. GG art. 19(2). The substantive law of criminal justice
(repressive) is federal, while state law governs the preventive area of police power and the maintenance of order (including matters which Americans would consider criminal law enforcement), see
supra notes 25, 67.
This more specific enumeration of protected rights is merely a result of the German Constitution's late date, insofar as the individual rights provisions were, at least superficially, influenced by
Anglo-American models following World War II. Significantly, however, the majority of Code of
Criminal Procedure provisions enabling searches and seizures of the person and property predate
the current Constitution and therefore are deemed constitutionalized, see supra note 5. The older
provisions have their source in the 1877 Reich Code of Criminal Procedure, while significant inroads
have been made recently due to social pressure to crack down on terrorism (e.g., the lex BaaderMeinhofi), see supra note 2.
87. The classical characterization of the prosecutor and his pre-trial role is "Herr des Ermittlungsverfahrens." His powers to undertake various specific investigative acts are set forth in the
statutes cited in note 89.
88. Furthermore, the capacity to choose to act under one or another set of substantive powers
of differing extent is a powerful device. It in effect shifts the watchdog function of administrative
review among different supervising agencies. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., STPO §§ 81a, 98, 100b, 105, 11 ie,125, 126a, 127.
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without prior instruction when they encounter situations on the street in the
presence of Gefahr in Verzug (danger in delay) if time does not allow them to
consult with civilian police authorities or the judge/public prosecutor. This
exigent circumstances exception is broadly interpreted. 90
The exception is commonly articulated in criminal procedure as follows:
"Danger in delay exists, whenever the [investigative measure's] success would
be endangered by the delay which would arise, if the responsible [judge] were
contacted." 9 1 The exception is formulated similarly for police law: "Danger
in delay exists, when in the absence of immediate action it is probable that
damage will result such that the success of required measures would be
92
reduced or impeded."
Procedural difficulties hamper a challenge to a policeman's claim that
delay would endanger results. More important for the challenger, however, is
the legal standard of review: whether in the subjective opinion of the
policeman such danger existed. 93 Practically speaking, unless an officer acts
in an openly arbitrary manner his true subjective conviction is a matter of
speculation. 94 The police make a decision theoretically reserved to the
90. German law also undercuts the content of "danger in delay" in the investigative area by
failing to require positive steps to prevent the loss or disappearance of evidence before exigent circumstances are recognized. For example, German law would not commonly recognize the necessity
of isolating and guarding a dwelling while a judicial warrant is applied for, as was suggested in Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). At the same time, certain constitutional rights of premier importance
may interact with facially neutral rules of constitutional law (Verhaltnismissigkeitsprinzip,see supra notes
17-18 and accompanying text) automatically to produce danger in delay. For example, the relatively
high value placed on liberty may render unlawful substantial detention (the deprivation of personal
freedom, including temporary police custody which can be less intrusive than either formal arrest or
incarceration) when otherwise necessary to the protection of property interests. Domiciliary privacy
is protected by requiring police to obtain the equivalent of a search warrant. Moreover, this rule
extends not only to the person and immediate surroundings of the accused, but also to searches of
his dwelling miles away on the ground that, if released, he could destroy the evidence concealed
there. For instance, a suspect picked up in a parking garage on suspicion of theft from automobiles
may be taken directly to his dwelling as part of a search for contraband. Unless and until the suspect
objects, the police would see a greater evil in detaining the suspect in anticipation of a warrant (liberty interest) than searching without a warrant (property interest).

91.

E.g., T.

KLEINKNECHT, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG

257 (34th ed. 1979) (comment 3 to STPO

§ 98). Translation of: "Gefahr im Verzug . . . besteht, wenn die richterliche Anordnung nicht
"
eingeholt werden kann, ohne dass der Zweck der Massnahme gef'ahrdet wird ....
92. R. BELZ, supra note 46, at 34 (comment 7 to PoLG § 2). Translation of: "Gefahr im Verzug
besteht, wenn ohne sofortiges Eingreifen mit Wahrscheinlichkeit ein Schaden eintreten und damit
der Erfolg der erforderlichen Massnahme beeintrichtigt oder vereitelt wiirde."
93. E.g., T. KLEINKNECHT, supra note 91, at 275 (comment 3 to STPO § 95). This is the majority
view, although it is subject to challenge. See also infra note 94; supra note 20.
94. Two empirical studies have attempted to quantify the shift of decisional competence to the
police through exigent circumstances exceptions. Both studies are subject to the caveat that they
dealt with limited samples of reported instances of police measures, and should therefore be viewed
as tentative.
U. Nelles, Kompetenzen und Ausnahmekompetenzen in der Strafprozessordnung: zur organisationsrechtlichen Funktion des Begriffs "Gefahr in Verzug" im Strafverfahrensrecht (1980) (dissertation) (a Nordrhein-Westfalen study sampling the 1971 cases of three prosecutors' offices: Bochum,
Duisburg, and Cologne), found that police acted without judicial supervision in criminal investigations in ordering searches of persons or property in 89.77% to 93.19% of the examined searches
(Durchsuchungen), id. at 215. The proportion of police-ordered searches of the person raises the
average, since the figures for property searches alone indicate that between 84.21% and 89.41% of
those searches are ordered by the police. Id. at 220. (Technically speaking, the study deals with
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German prosecutor or judge. At this level of activity, the police may be functionally independent although still subject to substantive law constraints.
B.

Maintenance of Order: Interlocks and Control of the Police by the
Civilian Administration

The coupled powers of review and command in police law require more
detailed examination. The chain of command is embedded in the civil and
law enforcement administrative hierarchies. Schematic diagrams (see
Appendix) provide an aid to visualization of the interrelation of administrative
levels and competences.
The civilian police authorities constitute the normal levels of general state
administration when they assume the mantle of state power in dealing with
police power concerns. The police authorities consist of the chief police
prosecutor's auxiliaries and not with police per se. For that reason, the figures may lump together
with regular police the actions of the other auxiliaries of the prosecutor, such as customs inspectors
or railroad security police. This fact should not significantly affect the statistics, however.) The
police also ordered, without supervision, seizures of property (including drivers' licenses) in between
91.79% and 94.86% of the examined seizures (Beschlagnahmen). Id. at 227. Yet the author of the
study came to the conclusion that Gefahr in Verzug was arguably present only in approximately 64% of
all searches, id. at 248, and 84% of all seizures, id.at 250. This finding may be interpreted as an
additional sign of police discretion in not adhering to the supervisory framework of the substantive
laws.
In a later study conducted in Berlin, J. EHRHARDT & C. KUNZE, ORDNUNGSVERWALTUNG-IM
SCHATrEN

DER

POLIZEI:

ORDNUNGSBEHORDEN

UNTERSUCHUNGEN

ZUM

VERHALTNIS

UND

ZUR

ZUSAMMENARBEIT

VON

UND POLIZEI (1982), the authors attempted to isolate police law measures, that

is, those undertaken by police acting for the local equivalent of police authorities when exercising
their peacekeeping function. This study indicated that police acted under police law without supervision in ordering 59.57% of identity checks (Identitdtsfeststellung); 40.42% of summons to appear in
person (Vorladung); 38.291% of entries of commercial establishments (Betreten von Geschaften); 34.041%
of sequestrations of property (Sicherstellung); 31.91% of entries to residences (Betreten von Wohnungen);
21.27% of searches of objects (Durchsuchung von Sachen); and 21.27% of searches of commercial
establishments (Durchsuchung von Geschaften). Id. at 91. These various measures were often taken in
concert. For example, the figures usually reflect double entries for the same occurrence under the
categories of identity checks and personal summons. Id. at 91-92.
The numbers demonstrate that the police often act alone despite the substantive law's assignment
of primary responsibility to other agencies. One may speculate that there is some difference in the
degree of decisional authority shifted between activities in the crimefighting and peacekeeping areas.
There is insufficient information to evaluate this apparent discrepancy, however, and it may only
indicate a preference for informal conflict resolution by police in the area of peacekeeping. Given
the tendency of the police to treat certain crimefighting matters as peacekeeping incidents, the more
meaningful inquiry is probably what percentage of police work falls into each category (in both
theory and practice). In this regard, it may also reflect methodological differences and a different
sampling segment than that employed in Nelles's study. Ehrhardt and Kunze depended upon voluntary questionnaire responses for their data, and the response rate was relatively low. Nelles analyzed
specific samples of existing case files at prosecutors' offices. It seems doubtful that Ehrhardt and
Kunze's results are related to the fact that Berlin is one of the German jurisdictions in which police
law has been reformed through the creation of Ordnungsbehorden as opposed to Polizeibehorden (as in
Baden-Wuirttemberg), see supra note 56. To read between the lines, Ehrhardt and Kunze seem surprised that the independent measures of the police are as infrequent as they appear to be. This
subjective impression may be grounded in the authors' political activism. Cf J. EHRHARDT & C.
KUNZE, MUSTERENTWURF EINES POLIZEIRECHTSTAATES (1979) (politicized criticism of the Musterentwurf; see supra note 2). Regardless of the exact extent to which decisions have shifted to the police
in either the crimefighting or peacekeeping areas, the shift has occurred to a significant degree. For
this reason, bureaucratic and similar control functions gain importance.
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authority for the state, 9 5 the regional police authorities,9 6 county police
authorities, 97 and the local police authorities (the mayor in smaller
localities).98
The state law enforcement agency is organized on a statewide basis with
distinct organizational units to serve localities. 99 Regional administrative districts (Regierungsbezirke), typically encompassing several county-sized administrative units, each have a regional office (Landespolizeidirektion) of the state law
enforcement agency as its supervising facility.' 0 0 Under the regional law
enforcement installation are local police facilities at the county or city level
(Polizeidirektionen, or, in rural areas, specialized Kommissariate). Each of these
local law enforcement facilities may be further divided into precincts
(Polizeireviere) in urban areas or outposts of several officers in rural areas
(Polizeiposten or Kriminalaussenstellenaccording to whether they are detective or
uniformed patrol detachments). The regional law enforcement agency installation is intended to be an umbrella or supervising agency which is normally
active only as an administrative instance; however, it does have its own officers
in the field and the authority to command police operations of local installations. In practice, local law enforcement installations are responsible for
policing in their localities and are superseded only in the case of special
events such as spectacular crimes, demonstrations, or other public happenings which tax local police manpower.
Review and command channels' 0 ' for the law enforcement agency may be
subdivided into three types of administrative review: normal supervision in
the execution of duties (Dienstaufsicht),'0 2 legality review (Fachaufsicht),to3and
supervision of particular matters (Sachaufsicht). 104 Dienstaufsicht extends to the
organization and conduct of law enforcement at an institutional level as well
as to personnel matters.io 5 Fachaufsicht consists of supervision and review of
95. PoLG § 48. The senior administrative level is normally the ministry responsible for the
subject area of the law, and is for most matters of general government a section within the Ministry of
the Interior. An example where this is not the case for an area of police concern would be traffic and
road safety, which falls under the Ministry of Transportation (Verkehrsministerium).
96. Id. The intermediate administrative level of the general state administration (Regierungsprdsidium) is exercised by a division within these regional authorities (for most matters the Public
Safety Division, Number 11). See organizational chart referred to in note 40 for more detail.
97. PoLG § 48. County police authorities are a local level of state administration, typically the
county administrative office (Landratsamt) or a larger incorporated municipality (Kreisstadt).
98. Id.
99. PoLG §§ 56, 57, 63, 64; Zweite Verordnung des Innenministeriums zur DurchfLihrung des
Polizeigesetzes §§ 3-21, Baden-Wirttemberg GBI 440 (1968), as amended. Special units include
highway details performing tasks similar to the state highway patrols in the United States, harbor and
water police details active on the Rhine, and police reserve and training units. The description in the
text is directed to the general law enforcement structure and not to special purpose units.
100. Regarding special treatment of Stuttgart, see note 39.
101. PoLG §§ 58-62. See the schematic diagrams in the Appendix for a general view of the
review and command channels.
102. Id. § 58.
103. Id. § 59.
104. Sachaufsicht is the prosecutor's administrative supervision over his auxiliaries in criminal
investigations. E.g., R. BELZ, supra note 46, at 225. See also supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
105. See R. BELZ, supra note 46, at 250-51; H. MAURER, supra note 11, at 392.
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the legality (review of legal or jurisdictional prerequisites) and desirability
(review of the exercise of discretion and individual decisions) of police
measures. 106
The power to give commands and the duty to channel information upward
within the administrative hierarchy supports the relationship between the law
enforcement agency installations and civilian police authorities.' 0 7 Responsible agencies for Dienstaufsicht or Fachaufsichtcan give direct commands to the
law enforcement agency installations, while these installations are duty bound
to provide information to superior agencies in a form which will allow the
latter to exercise their supervisory capacities. 0 8
Within the law enforcement hierarchy, civilian police authorities at the
intermediate administration level (Regierungsprdsidium) and in the senior level
of administration (Ministry of the Interior) exercise Dienstaufsicht over regional
law enforcement facilities (Landespolizeidirektionen), while the regional law
enforcement installations share review and supervisory powers over local
police installations with these higher administrative levels. Fachaufsicht, however, is theoretically almost exclusively exercised by civilian police authorities:
those in the senior level of administration supervise regional law enforcement
installations, as well as local police authorities (civilian) up to the level of
mayor in individual localities.
In rough terms, the above scheme sets forth the substantive law structure
of intra-administration control. Supervision flows along the vertical chain of
command, allowing review of police measures down to those taken by individual officers. Dienstaufsicht over the law enforcement agency is conducted
chiefly by the police at the level between regional and local law enforcement
installations. At a higher level, the regional governing authorities and the
Ministry of the Interior (theoretically civilian) are responsible for supervision.
Fachaufsicht is exercised over law enforcement installations by all levels of
civilian administration (down to the level of local mayors in small hamlets). In
general, supervisory power should lie with civilians located outside the law
enforcement agency hierarchy. Since the state legislature exercises review
over the ministries, there is also indirect accountability for police actions.
Intra-administration review can also result from citizen initiatives. In
German administrative law, recourse for citizens dissatisfied with actions of
the government consists first of the right to file an "administrative complaint"
t
(Beschwerderecht). 19
The complaint is the initial step in the challenge of an
administrative act (Verwaltungsakt)."10 Each public authority is legally bound
106. See R. BELZ, supra note 46, at 252-54.
107. PoLG § 61. See notes 111-15 and accompanying text for actual practices limiting the flow
of information.
108. POLG § 62.
109. At the constitutional level, article 17 of the German Federal Constitution (right of petition
to redress grievances similar to the first amendment to the United States Constitution) regulates the
relationship between the citizen and the State. The State is required to respond to its citizens insofar
as it must provide administrative recourse for complaints directed against the exercise of state power.
110. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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either to evaluate any such complaint or to forward it to the responsible
agency. This manner of triggering internal agency review is best understood
as a function of the hierarchical administration (an aspect of its review and
command functions). The duty to direct complaints to the responsible
reviewing parties works in a horizontal fashion when complaints are distributed among government agencies. The vertical hierarchy stretching from the
Ministry of the Interior as the senior supervisory body for both civilian police
authorities and the law enforcement agency is, at the same time, a communication channel and chain of command.
In practice, supervision of the police peacekeeping function diverges from
theory-as did the crimefighting relationship between police and public prosecutor. One significant reason for this divergence is a certain reluctance at
the level of local law enforcement installations strictly to categorize typical
complaints and distribute them horizontally to the responsible administrative
instance. I I
At a higher institutional level, an administrative practice exists whereby
the chief of the regional law enforcement installation (Landespolizeidirektion) is
appointed as head of the public safety division (police authority) of the
regional administrative level of government (Regierungsprsidium).t" 2 Thus,
the chief policeman (typically a lawyer) is also the person responsible for
supervision of local civilian agencies exercising their powers in most
peacekeeping functions. This personnel congruence in effect restructures the
3
supervisory function, which would otherwise run through civilians. 11
In theory, Fachaufsicht provides a counterweight by opening a horizontal
path to civilian police authorities on the local level, but in practice Fachaufsicht
and Dienstaufsicht are barely separable.' 1 4 Most citizen complaints are confused recitations that something happened, without necessarily supplying
detail relevant to their legal characterization.
Some local law enforcement installations attempt to separate Dienstaufsicht
111. Senior police management in local police stations offer a number of reasons for this practice. Common themes are: (1) the civilian administration would not understand the complaint in
context; (2) in the case of mixed complaints, it is inefficient or unseemly to "split" a complaint and
have two offices address its different aspects; and (3) citizens do not care who works on a complaint,
so long as it is taken care of by the government.
112. The chief of the Landespolizeidirektion and his assistant are simultaneously assigned to head
Section 11 (Public Safety) of the Regie-ungsprsidium under an organizational directive of the Interior
Ministry (Polizeiorganisationserlass).See R. BELZ, supra note 46, at 246, 247 (comment 12 to PoLG § 56);
see also supra note 96 and accompanying text.
113. Administrative practices differ to a certain extent between districts but, as an extreme
example, in one Baden-Wfirttemberg Regierungsbezirk in 1980 the person ultimately responsible for
dealing with complaints was the in-house counsel and senior assistant to the district police chief. He
was simultaneously in two administrative hierarchies (Polizevollzugsdienst and Polizeibehrden) but was
the ultimate recipient of complaints for both at the district level. In practice, he simply employed two
different letterheads in his responses, choosing his stationery according to which of his administrative positions the complaint formally addressed.
114. Cases of pure Fachaufsicht complaints occur when police officers in emergency situations
exercise the powers of the police authorities, which a disadvantaged individual then challenges as
technically illegal to avoid imposition of costs, etc. Otherwise, the typical Fachaufsichtsbeschwerde
involves the challenge of a parking ticket or moving violation on narrow grounds of alleged
unlawfulness.
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from Fachaufsichtaspects of complaints (a determination normally made by the
local police chief or a senior assistant), but many simply treat mixed complaints as matters of Dienstaufsicht."t5 For this reason, many complaints remain
within the police hierarchy despite a formal duty to inform civilian police
authorities.
Sachaufsicht of the prosecutor is only Fachaufsicht in the area of
crimefighting. This supervision, however, can occur only in the context of an
ongoing criminal investigation." 6 Whether the prosecutor ever becomes
cognizant of the incident if the complainant chooses not to bring criminal
charges against police for alleged misconduct (such as false imprisonment or
assault) is determined by the fluid boundaries between the maintenance of
order and crimefighting, and the contours of the criminal investigation.
V
POLICE DISCRETION IN PRACTICE

With a sense of the institutional and legal culture influencing German
police, a direct examination of police discretion can be made. The influence
is observable on two levels: the institutional level, at which police management may make policy determinations; and the level of individual enforcement by police officers, where the question is whether any pergon who
becomes the subject of police interest is treated like a similarly situated
person. Discrimination per se is not at issue; the focus is rather on arbitrary
enforcement decisions. While the institutional level of discretion involves a
legal inquiry, isolating enforcement concerns entails a sociological inquiry.
A.

Police Discretion at the Institutional Level

Theoretically, West German police act under the direction of civilian
authorities, whether the prosecutor in crimefighting or the civil administration in peacekeeping. Despite the fact that German law incorporates this theoretical bias, in practice the police are established as an independent
organization. The police are a professional force with their own internal
review and statewide command structures, however, so independence does
not imply freedom from control for individual officers.
It is probably a mistake to attribute to the police a direct desire to escape
external controls in connection with the establishment of their institutional
independence. Circumstances beyond the police's control have led to a
serious weakening of the supervisory and command functions of superior
civilian administrative officials. The police are secondarily affected by other
agencies' problems. At the level of the prosecutor's office, high crime rates
and inadequate staffing have led to a situation in which the police operate on
17
behalf of but not under the immediate control of the public prosecutor.
115. See supra note 111. In some police stations there is also an effort after the fact to inform
responsible police authorities by sending them a copy of the complaint response. Administrative
practices cover a broad spectrum, which indicates that at this level procedural treatment may be
more significant than substantive law.
116. See supra notes 45-47, 64-68, 75-85 and accompanying text.
117. W. STEFFEN, supra note 64, at 267-68.
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In the area of civilian administration, the most significant explanation perhaps lies in the bureaucratic character of police authorities and the nature of
the public safety task. The normal civil administration in its capacity as police
authorities operates on a 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. weekday schedule. It is possible to overstate the case, but maintaining public order is an around-theclock matter. Police are forced to take immediate unsupervised measures
much of the time. After-hours consultations with local civilian officials sometimes occur, but only in serious situations and only after a problem has
worked its way up the police chain of command. Again, shifting to the police
the practical authority to make decisions has not resulted from factors within
their control. At most, police channel decisions at the level of after-the-fact
review through their treatment of administrative complaints.
Evaluating the current state of affairs in terms of "discretion" is not a
simple task, since the police colorably act under lawfully delegated authority
in performing crimefighting and peacekeeping functions. The police exercise
the authority of the public prosecutor and civilian administration. Tasks conceived in the nineteenth century have outgrown budgetary allocations while
the underlying structure of the law and distribution of decisional authority
have n6t changed.I"'
When the police exercise their broad powers and make decisions designed
for civilian authorities, do they exercise discretion? Viewed from the perspective of German law and the strict version of the rule of law, this question is
susceptible of different answers. The availability of administrative and judicial
review may limit the police's decisional scope much as it limits that of civilian
authorities. By definition, however, this position is contingent upon the availability of administrative review (which may lose some attractiveness if it is
police internal review instead of external civilian control) and the actual pursuit of judicial review by citizens.
The shifting of practical responsibility for decisions among institutions
raises concerns in the West German system's own terms. To be "right,"
regardless of its content, a decision must be made by the proper authority.
With regard to the exigent circumstances provisions under which police may
act in place of other authorities, recent scholarship indicates a relatively high
level of activity.' 19 As a matter of doctrine, special treatment of the theoretical exception is supported by an implicit characterization of police exercising
118. The doctrinal development has at least kept pace insofar as the Legalito.sprinzip has been
extended to cover police as the prosecutor's auxiliaries. In a historical sense, the original reform
scheme for criminal procedure, see supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text, did not foresee its application to the police as an independent institution. A small minority of academic commentators
adhere to the view that the Legalitatsprinzipis not applicable to police because of the historic anomaly.
E.g., F. GORGEN, supra note 44. Practice has overtaken history, however, so the better modern view
extends the Legaliltsprinzip to the police. E.g., V. GOTZ, supra note 49, at 72. It might be possible to
read a similar expansion shaping the law as an effort to accommodate practice to the increased judicial review of police activities, see supra note 20, but that may be overinterpretation.
119. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. The exact magnitude of the shift remains
open to question since the currently available work is limited in scope and tentative in conclusions.
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the power of other authorities as those authorities themselves (the "prosecutor's auxiliaries," for example). By ex officio participation in the decisionmaking justification of these authorities, the police arguably act as part of the
prosecutor's quasi-judicial. office or the civil administration. It is a comfortable legal fiction, but police do not change their role in enforcement.
The letter of the law is preserved in special circumstance exceptions, but
its spirit may be violated by the de facto migration of decisionmaking
authority. To the extent the "wrong" party makes the decision and review is
not pursued through the courts, what occurs is either (1) the functional
equivalent of discretion in an unlawful decision not rectified or (2) the imposition of police-created enforcement policy as the basis of the decision.
B.

Police Enforcement Discretion on the Street

To pass from institutions to the individual enforcement decision is to leave
law and enter the realm of police sociology. The West German literature 20 in
this area is limited. t 21 Researchers have conducted a few studies in the
crimefighting area, revolving around the relationship between public prosecutor and police in the administration of the Legalitdtsprinzip.'2 2 Other work
has examined factors influencing selective enforcement of laws by the police
(including the peacekeeping area) and the policies or principles which inform
1 23
individual enforcement decisions.
Relying consciously on American police sociology and criminological
labeling theories, German sociologists in the late 1960's developed a theory
of selective sanctioning by the police.'

24

This theory questions the legalistic

120. Much analysis suffers from unfortunate ideological hyperbole, with politically sensitized
sociologists attempting to demonstrate the role of the police in alleged class justice. See, e.g., H.
SCHOLLER & S. BROSS, GRUNDZUGE DES POLIZEI- UND ORDNUNGSRECHTS

IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK

DEUTSCHLAND 1-II (2d ed. 1978). Otherwise neutral analysis is often influenced in its premises by
this existing literature. As a social institution under fire, see supra note 2, the police have drawn their
share of politicized journalism. E.g., R. G6SSNER & U. HERZOG, DER APPARAT: ERMITrLUNGEN IN
SACHE POLIZEI (1982).
121.
One non-German work bears special mention: R. GIRTLER, POLIZE1-ALLTAG: STRATEGIEN,
ZIELE UND STRUKTUREN POLIZEILICHEN HANDELNS (1980). This work, describing the operations of the

Viennese police from the perspective of the observer-participant, was completed after much of the
German work and consequently profited by the prior work's experience. Austrian law and society
shares many features with Germany, so this work is generally comparable.
122. Chiefly W. STEFFEN, supra note 64; E. BLANKENBURG, K. SESSAR & W. STEFFEN, supra note
82.
123. See, e.g., J. FEEST & E. BLANKENBURG, supra note 72; J. KURZINGER, PRIVATE STRAFANZEIGE
UND POLIZEILICHE REAKTION (1978); Brusten, Determinanten selektiver Sanktionterung durch die Polizei, in
DIE POLIZEI: SOZIOLOGISCHE STUDIEN UND FORSCHUNGSBERICHTE 31-70 (J. Feest & R. Lautmann eds.
1971); S. Hornthal, Analyse psychologischer Merkmale in Ermessen von Polizeibeamten (1975)
(dissertation).
124. Brusten, supra note 123, developed the theoretical aspects most clearly, although the same
themes are present in earlier publications. See, e.g., Brusten, Selektive Sanktionierung durch die Polizei,
[1969] KRIMINOLOGISCHES JOURNAL 2. The empirical work related to this position is from the circle
of authors around Feest and Blankenburg (Arbeitskreisjunger Kriminologen), with J. FEEST & E. BLANKENBURG, supra note 72, as perhaps the leading work. The literature is summarized as of 1976 in W.
STEFFEN, supra note 64, at 44-50. The American connection exists through the tendency of this
group to rely on American criminologists' work in formulating hypotheses to be examined in their
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analysis of discretion, and instead hypothesizes that it is "social discretion"
which informs police actions.1 25 According to the theory's proponents,
because police cannot act in a vacuum the legalistic discretion concept misconceives the police's position and effect on the social process. Strict compliance with the Legalitdtsprinzip, requiring thorough investigation of all potential
crimes, is not a realistic option; therefore, pursuit of individual offenses is
presumably a matter of police discretion. Under this theory, selective sanctioning arose because ambiguous expectations are directed at police and their
internal resource allocation decisions. 12 6 The selective sanctioning was channeled, however, by the social choices of the police.
Sociologists also advance the theory that the subjective goal of police
operations is to produce visible success in the form of a high solution rate for
reported crime. 1 27 Unpromising crimes are either never recorded or not
actively pursued, since police effort not resulting in crime-solving would be
wasted. At the same time, police develop their own operational criteria for
suspicious behavior. Under this approach, policemen on patrol do not concentrate on solving individual crimes, but rather exercise discretion in attributing criminality to specific classes of alleged offenders and investigating
them. 128 As a, result, criminalization is concentrated among groups drawn
1 29
predominantly from the working class.
In 1969, an observer-participant ride-along patrol study was conducted in
a large German city.'

30

This study complemented earlier, nonempirical work

investigating the ability of the police to use their position to characterize the
social situation in certain terms.' 3 ' Its authors hypothesized that this discretionary power of definition (Definitionsmacht) works on a class-specific basis.
Decisional criteria for the police in undertaking action are typified as: (1) the
neighborhood in which a suspect is encountered; (2) the suspect's appearance; and (3) his behavior as understood by the police. 132 The context for
police-suspect encounters in which police discretion comes to the fore
involves incidents of "suspicious" behavior, conflict situations, and minor
offenses. Resolution of these incidents implicates the social values and
prejudices of the police. On the whole, the police role on the street consists
33
more of maintaining order (controlling situations) than of crimefighting.1
The patrol study implicitly assumes that policemen riding in patrol cars
deal with concrete situations rather than the doctrinal categories of
German studies. J. FEEST & E. BLANKENBURG, supra note 72, is in part an attempt to replicate the
work of Jerome Skolnick in a German context.
125. J. FEEST & E. BLANKENBURG, supra note 72, at 17-19.
126. Brusten, supra note 123, at 40-41.
127. See id. at 45-49.

128. J.

FEEST

& E.

BLANKENBURG,

supra note 72, at 35-57.

129. Brusten, supra note 123, at 41-45, 47-49.
130. J. FEEST & E. BLANKENBURG, supra note 72. This south German city is located outside
Baden-Wiirttemberg.
131. Id. at 45-55.
132. Id. at 36-39.
133. Id. at 86-113.
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crimefighting and peacekeeping. Legal definitions justifying actions are
applied after the fact. In practice, police develop an interest in a person as
"suspicious" and manufacture grounds for investigation. For example, police
might stop a car for malfunctioning tail lights when their real goal is to
34
examine the car and determine the driver's identity.'
The study captures several important aspects of West German police operations. It explores the difference in attitudes and expectations between
patrolmen and police management at the precinct level and higher.' 3 5 This
distinction has been pursued in later studies that distinguish between the legal
knowledge imparted to cadets at the police academy and professional socialization occurring in the course of probationary training periods (conducted in
the company of experienced policemen). 13 6 If discretion is influenced by
norms below the statutory level, it is most likely through the formal or
informal educational process.
The definitional power of the police is viewed as a social manifestation of
the ignorance and vulnerability of working class suspects. Without knowledge
of their rights, these suspects are subject to the policeman's mastery of the
laws. Middle and upperclass suspects, however, possess the means to challenge the police's view of a given situation. Furthermore, the same suspect,
by virtue of education or position, possesses -the presumed social ability to
make life difficult for the policeman (by challenging the latter's characterization of the situation through exercising powers of complaint or
Beschwerdemacht). Beschwerdemacht is best understood as a practical awareness
of the possibilities of judicial and administrative review of police actions coupled with the complainant's inherent credibility before the reviewing
3 7

authority. 1

A 1975 Hamburg study' 38 expressly focused on police discretion by
testing the reactions of patrolmen to minor traffic law violations (which are
petty offenses or Ordnungswidrigkeiten subject to the Opportunitdtsprinzip). The
study attempted to isolate psychological factors affecting the exercise of discretion. Police officers were presented with a variety of situations involving
134. As a supporting example, during the peak of terrorist activity in the 1970's, association
with certain causes of the extreme left was treated as grounds for suspicion among security-conscious
West German police. Numerous cases arose involving demonstrators' efforts to have courts order
destruction of fingerprints and identity information taken by police in connection with arrests which
were challenged as based solely on a desire to identify political sympathizers of radical leftists. Similarly, street vendors of extremist publications complained of harassment in the form of fingerprinting
and identification measures after being taken into custody on charges that they were peddling merchandise without a license (alleging discriminatory enforcement to establish their identity).
135. See, e.g., J. FEEST & E. BLANKENBURG, supra note 72, at 27-31.
136. See, e.g., R. Spiegelberg, Qualifikatorische Aspekte der Sozialisation in den Polizeiberuf unter besonderer Bericksichtigung der Einstellungsinderungen gegeniuber dem Publikum (1977)
(dissertation).
137. J. FEEST & E. BLANKENBURG, supra note 72, at 46-50, 81-83, 108, 112.
138. S. Hornthal, supra note 123. This study was conducted by a psychologist outside of the
group ArbeitskreisjngerKriminologen otherwise responsible for much of police sociology, see supra note
124. It reviews their work relating to police discretion, S. Hornthal, supra note 123, at 8-10, but is not
commonly cited by German scholarship in reviewing police studies. However, it does represent a
rare study of discretion on the enforcement level.
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traffic violations.' 39 They could respond by making the threshold decision of
whether to issue a Verwarnung (the functional equivalent of a ticket) and then
by deciding how much offenders should be fined. The following variables
were altered among the hypothetical offenders: (1) age; (2) sex; (3) polite
reaction to address by the officers; (4) acceptance by offenders that they had
committed a meaningful violation; and (5) social status." 40 To place the test
in context, an official publication (Bussgeldkatalog) sets forth a range of recommended fines for various traffic offenses, advising higher or lower ranges
depending on whether the violation would be considered a minor or serious
violation of the same legal rule. Police normally do not work with this "tariff"
4
in hand, but they are presumed to employ its general ranges in practice. '
The results of the study qualify the social discretion concept advanced in
sociological work. In articulating decisional grounds, many police indicated
that legal definition in terms of the elements of the offense was of greater
importance to them than social factors such as politeness, acceptance of the
violation, or social status. 14 2 In this sense, training and knowledge of the law
did make a difference in the actions of the officers. Furthermore, there was a
correlation between knowledge of enforcement guidelines and actual fines
3
levied. 14
The study showed no significant correlation between the amount of the
fine and age, sex, or social class. Offenders were punished significantly more
often and with higher fines, however, if they were not polite or did not
acknowledge that they had violated the law. 14 4 This behavior differed from
certain assumptions of the original labeling school theorists relating to social
45
perceptions and class justice.'
The test subjects' personal state of mind played some role, since police
with more authoritarian personalities gave higher fines, while those dissatisfied with their jobs fined less often. The study concluded that police aggression when meeting offender resistance is in the nature of a personal reprisal.
In this sense, the exercise of discretion is in effect punishment of the offender
for his or her post-violation conduct and is not functionally related to the
offense committed.
139.
140.

S. Hornthal, supra note 123, at 11-37.
Id. at 15-18.

141. The test subjects were drawn from the ranks of patrolmen, although a certain number were
in training for promotion to police middle management. The first stage of the tests elicited
responses to written descriptions of situations. The responses were then compared to related peer
evaluation inquiries for a different group of police subjects. These results confirmed those of the
written hypothetical test. Test subjects were also asked a number of questions to determine their
knowledge of both substantive law and the published recommendations for fines and were given
personality tests.
142. See S. Hornthal, supra note 123, at 126-27.
143. It is possible that more knowledgeable police officers simply took written tests better.
However, the correlation with evaluations in the second half of the test gravitates against this conclusion. The behavior of all officers, reacting to different social situations, indicated that their reaction
was to the situation presented to them in the test and not to the testing process itself.
144. The author of the study found instances of this behavior to be significantly present in
otherwise factually varying cases, S. Hornthal, supra note 123, at 79-84.
145. Id. at 127-29.
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The study also concluded that social justice would best be achieved
through focusing police training and education on the suggested norm-the
substantive offenses and recommended responses to violations. 1 46 The influence of personality, social views, and situational externalities should be
reduced to a minimum. Acceptable considerations for discretion require
development, but the manner of violation (whether cold-blooded),
excusability of an offense, degree to which others are endangered, and
damage incurred are suggested as legitimate considerations. By isolating
such factors and educating officers, the police would presumably achieve
greater conformity when exercising the recommended discretion in
enforcement.
A 1976 study 14 7 of police criminal investigations based on group interviews and court file analysis isolated several selection criteria for police
crimefighting activities. Three factors were determined to influence the
police's decision whether to allocate resources to the serious investigation of a
given offense: (1) the visibility of an offense to outsiders as expressed in differential reporting rates of crime, with the result that individual reports of
high volume offenses might not receive serious attention; (2) the probability
of isolating suspects for the offense (based on experience with the type of
reported crime, police might choose not to pursue reported offenses if no
suspect were immediately known); and (3) the degree of difficulty of proving
that a specific suspect had committed a given crime, assuming that he had
been identified.' 48 This study concluded that police do not pay undue attention to considerations of social position in making enforcement decisions,
although a suspect's youth was found to affect the likelihood of active investigation pursued to the point of conviction. 149 Rather, police concentrated
mainly on factors related to individual offenses.
A 1978 study' 50 conducted in the small town suburb of a regional population center attempted to measure police reactions to private parties' reports
of certain minor crimes by means of observer-participation (as a reserve
policeman) and the review of police records. The study found that, in practice, police differentiate among offenses in deciding whether to register such
reports (even where the Legalitdtsprinzip mandated it).151 Individual policemen
act as filters for reports of offenses. Under certain circumstances, policemen
146. Id. at 130-32.
147. W. STEFFEN, supra note 64.
148. Id. at 292-93. The third factor was found only to affect the intensity of investigation insofar
as more resources were invested in the effort (despite the apparent lower probability of success in
some cases). The objective criteria for cases considered difficult to prove may, however, provide an
explanation. Typically, cases involving confessions and suspects with prior criminal records were
considered to be easier, while difficult cases involved circumstantial evidence.
149. Id. at 293.
150. J. KURZINGER, supra note 123.
151. The complaints typically involved reports of offenses after their commission-as opposed
to those discovered by the police in progress-and so allowed an analysis of crimefighting activities
less influenced by peacekeeping concerns. The offenses in question were also minor offenses in a
special class on the level of theft and assaults close to the lower boundaries of the Legalitdtsprinzip
(Antragsdelikte).
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try to talk individuals out of reporting minor offenses.' 5 2 The study concluded that a majority (70%) of reported offenses against the person are not
taken down in written reports. 5 3 In contrast, 97% of reports of offenses
against property are recorded in a written report. 5 4 The creation of a written
record automatically enters the incident into crime statistics and is a necessary
condition to active criminal investigation. On this basis, the study concluded
that loss of property is more likely to lead the police to pursue criminal investigations than those offenses against the person which do not lead to any
serious or lasting injury.' 55 This conclusion is qualified by the fact that only
minor infractions were involved in all cases.
The literature of police studies demonstrates apparent police discretion in
application of the Legalitdtsprinzip. This conclusion is not surprising insofar as
practically all studies begin with the premise that even if the police desire to
fulfill all tasks assigned by lawmakers, they lack the resources. The discretion
alleged by most researchers is selective enforcement of laws and not overenforcement. This police activity may reflect conscious decisions, but are
these decisions policy determinations usurping lawmakers' prerogatives?
One approach in the literature theorizes that the police's own social
prejudices and values make them an instrument for the criminalization of
selected offender groups, while another sees the rational allocation of scarce
resources as the engine of choice.
To the extent that police do not receive adequate material resources to
fulfill tasks assigned by lawmakers, it seems misleading to characterize choices
forced upon the police as the "exercise of discretion." Social selectivity theories typically infer a police enforcement policy only by assuming common
social backgrounds and values for policemen as a group (which are brought to
the fore in police enforcement). Individual enforcement decisions based on
personal values undoubtedly occur, but assigning values to the police across
the board ignores diversity and internal organizational tension.
Interesting problems exist at the enforcement level due to divisions within
the police, which problems are noted but not fully addressed in this article or
the German literature. The goals and attitudes of police management do not
necessarily coincide with those of officers on patrol. Subjectively, police management adheres more to a theoretical legal model, except insofar as it may
have attempted to establish the police as an independent institution. The
individual policeman on patrol is more interested in securing social peace and
avoiding wasted personal effort. He pays correspondingly less attention to
152. J. K.RZINGER, supra note 123, at 215-18.
153. Id. at 227.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 236-37. Individual policemen challenge any general property bias interpretation,
however, on the basis that the reports of offenses against the person typically involve domestic disputes. Policemen state that the peculiar posture of domestic disputes leads them to neglect this
category of offenses. The complainant may file a complaint, but after reconciliation will refuse to
follow it through with evidence at trial. On that basis, police view active prosecution of such complaints usually as a waste of time.
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technical requirements in responding to situations. This internal tension
seems less a matter of the exercise of police discretion (understood as policyoriented) and more a supervision and management concern.
Another apparent direction of discretion involves the police's decriminalization of potential offenses by treating them as peacekeeping matters. In
most cases, the police's own categorization of the police measure is decisive.
The tendency of officers on the beat to deemphasize fighting crime in favor of
maintaining public order (at least in cases of less serious offenses) results in a
situation in which a criminal offense may be present but the police act only to
maintain order. For example, a fist-fight in a bar should result in the opening
of a criminal assault investigation, but the police commonly take the offenders
into police custody (not criminal arrest) to let them sober up in the drunk
tank. Unless there is property damage in the bar, no one but the troublemakers has grounds to complain about police actions (and they naturally will
not challenge the police's failure to file charges against them). So long as the
policeman perceives his chief role as keeping the peace, the competing concerns and decision whether a particular police measure serves the
peacekeeping or crimefighting function make for ambiguity. This is the most
visible area in which police judgment replaces that of lawmakers; however, in
this situation the police's actions are typically on the borderline between
crimefighting and peacekeeping functions. Rather than unauthorized policymaking, any pattern may represent a post hoc aggregation of individual
enforcement decisions. This behavior may also be the subject of an implicit
analysis that criminalization is a waste of effort for these minor matters (a
potential policy decision), but it conceivably relates back to resource allocation concerns.
VI
RELEVANCE OF THE COMPARATIVE INQUIRY FOR
THE AMERICAN SITUATION

In a cross-cultural inquiry, any conclusions must remain at the level of
analogy and implicit comparison. With that caveat, the following are offered
as lines of further inquiry addressed to the American situation.
It is possible to both articulate standards for discretion and establish judicial and internal governmental review of its exercise under given circumstances. This possibility raises issues of whether and why the police should be
treated differently from other governmental agencies. Moreover, controlling
or channeling police discretion would require more than simply changing a
few statutes. American police are active in areas outside of criminal justice;
limiting discretion in those areas would require a different institutional and
political outlook. At a minimum, it would be necessary for the judiciary to
engage in review of day-to-day executive decisions to an extent foreign to the
American lawyer. Due to the highly visible collision of individual rights and
government power, however, American police activities in criminal law
enforcement are already subject to significant judicial examination.
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West German police may have discretion thrust upon them by practical
budgetary constraints. Discretion becomes the choice of which tasks to
neglect when it is not possible to do everything. In the American context, the
choice between fewer legal norms to enforce and more resources for enforcement is a question on which reasonable men may differ. Unless this choice is
made by lawmakers, however, it may be misleading to concentrate on selective
sanctioning as unwanted police discretion in enforcement.' 5 6
By virtue of outlook and incentives, police on patrol may concentrate on
peacekeeping in dealing with conflict situations. This fact bears repeating,
since lawmakers' plans for police are often constructed with legal categories
from the crimefighting/law enforcement end of the spectrum. The failure of
police to adhere to the strict categories may result from a conflict between
lawmakers and the police over the latter's primary role. Some police discretion in selective enforcement may result from lawmakers' misunderstanding
of the functional enforcement possibilities in general. Misconceived statutory
schemes will be met with selective enforcement (or nonenforcement), so
lawmakers' failure to consider enforcement practicalities in the lawmaking
process may itself encourage police discretion.
Discretion at the enforcement level may be channeled through training.
Training should inculcate certain standards upon which policemen can draw
in practice. The question remains who should formulate these standards and
what factors should be taken into account, but this may be no more difficult
than, for example, the statutory formulation of sentencing considerations for
judges. Such official recommendations regarding enforcement should not be
rejected as too theoretical for police operations.
Channeling discretion through training requires a high level of long-term
effort. If it is any indication, considerably more time and effort are devoted to
police training in Germany than in the United States. Additionally, German
police training is structured differently in that training at career commencement (and at shifts between various rank groups) predominates over the type
of continuing professional education popular with American police. The long
initial training of German police is followed by relatively active supervision by
police management. Although there are inherent limitations in deskbound
supervision of officers on patrol, it can be made more effective through the
feedback mechanism of complaints.
An interesting corollary to the positive side of training is that lack of
training may have the regrettable effect of increasing arbitrariness in decisions. On-the-job training should not be relied on to fill this gap, since
without direction from senior police management this version of professional
156. In this context, the question of discretion and the rule of law as presented by Professor
Davis, see supra note 1, bears reexamination. Harking back to his strawman of the reasonable versus
extravagant versions of the rule of law it appears that, at least in the German context and for German
courts, see H. MAURER, supra note 11, at 96-97, the strict or extravagant version limiting police discretion in substantive law provides a framework for evaluating discretion in enforcement. Budgetary
constraints do affect practice, but they cannot say anything about the quality of actions actually taken.

220

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 47: No. 4

socialization will not inculcate lawmakers' values. Without discretion-channeling values provided in training, the patrolman is left with his own opinions.
Even with the best intentions, there can be no uniform enforcement. In terms
of social selectivity, discriminatory enforcement may be more likely where
there is no competing set of official guidelines enforced by police
management.
Although comprehensive civilian supervision is a difficult goal in practice,
conscientious operational management of the professionalized police force
may achieve the same result. Assuming realistic enforcement standards exist,
their implementation is best conceived of as a managerial process in the
nature of quality control. Enforcement guidelines are, in this light, performance specifications. Internal administrative controls may require the threat of
judicial review or other external sanctions to ensure that they are followed in
practice, but positive incentives and training are better guarantors of
performance.
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APPENDIX
DIAGRAM

2

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL OF THE BADEN-WURTTEMBERG

POLICE*

Interior Ministry
Section III

I
Regierungsprdsidium
Stuttgart
Landespolizeidirektion
Stuttgart

Landespolizeidirektion
Stuttgart

4419
Officers

2085
Officers

Regterungsprasidium
Karlsruhe

Regieningsprdsidium
Freiburg

Regierungsprdidium
Tfibingen

Landspolzeidirektion
Karlsruhe

Landespolizeidirektion
Freiburg

Landespolizeidirektion
Tibingen

4738
Officers

2871
Officers

2243
Officers

2 Polizeiprdstdten
(police
headquarters
for large city)
8 Polizeidirektionen

3 Polizeidirektionen

5 Polizeidirektionen

6 Polizeidirektionen

3 Police
Kommissanate

4 Police
Kommissariate

4 Police
Kommissanate

2 Police
Kommissariate

2 Criminal
Komissanate

3 Criminal
Koramissaiate

3 Criminal
Kommuisanate

2 Criminal
Kommissanate

I Traffic
Kommssarial

I Traffic
Kommiusariat

1 Traffic
Kommissariat

I Traffic
Kommissanal

Harbor Police

I

Harbor Police
Headquarters

I
Special Group
and Training
Headquarters

I
State Criminal
Bureau

Schools

I

3 Sections

9 Areas

14 Divisions

20 Training
Companies

The number of officers given is from the 1979 budget and represents budget allocations, not actual personnel. The
difference is not material in practice.
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